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手植记:旅行找食材,原生本初心

手植记:旅行找食材,原生本初心

 

手植记:旅行找食材,原生本初心

2015年央视“3.15晚会”刚刚结束,今年的主题是“消费在阳光下”,小编特别留意了一下,今年的晚会在食品安全方面并没有过多阐述,其中一个亮点性的内容是在食品安全召回方面有了制度上的规范。当然我们不希望等到食品召回时才发现有安全问题,那早已晚了,于是如何吃得好,吃得安全就成了亟需解决的问题。

事情发生问题,我们的第一反应就是寻找原因,因为寻找根源才是问题解决之本,作为生活在钢筋混凝土包围的都市人群,每天高楼大厦、工业污染、尾气排放,处处都充满着危机感。在都市中生活的越久,人们越觉得植物自然生长带来的魅力,对原生食材的关注和诉求也越来越多。

谈“吃”色变是现代人对都市生活方式的真实写照,这个想吃,怕抹激素,那个也想尝尝,怕添加防腐剂,想起那捧起一捧溪水就能张口大喝的日子,一阵唏嘘,这也不过是十几年的时间,我们的世界已经被各种污染、添加剂所侵蚀,想寻点原生态的食材也成为一种奢侈。越难寻找就越有人参与到其中,体验与大自然亲密接触。从央视的《舌尖上的中国》到《走遍中国》,再到互联网年轻群体的小圈层活动,越来越多的团队参与到寻找原生食材的行列之中。

  “手植之旅”的诞生便成为一种必然。“手植之旅”是由原生农产品电商品牌手植记组织发起的在全国探寻原生食材的一个寻访活动,目前已开展两季(第一季,为生活探寻原生食材,主要是山东丘陵地区,第二季,专注于食物与生活的品质,主要是山西太行山脉地区。)手植记最早这个想法来自于某创意公司CEO的一个小私心,他觉得原生食材确实是难得的好东西,就想着找来给员工发福利,改善一下员工的生活品质,却意外发现人们对原生食材需求很大,便想着干脆把它做成一个品牌吧。没想到竟迅速赢得大众的认可,也积累了不少忠实的顾客。

一个招募生活理念相同的人参与其中,一起寻访手植系食材,共同追求积极的生活精神和生活品质的想法便逐渐成型。说起“手植之旅”的初衷,用他们自己的话就是:“不道听途说,寻找真正的原生食材,送给自己和家人,算是在奔向大叔/大妈的旅途中,做出的一点点改变”。

手植记的一系列活动也为那些平时没时间打理自己生活,加班熬夜且满脸痘痘还依然热爱生活,积极向上的都市人,在繁杂的生活中增添点阳光之色。

  手植记
  我们快乐&精神食粮
  为生活寻找原生态食材

AN INTRODUCTION TO
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
by
A.R.M.MURRAY, M.A., PH.D.
Extension Lecturer in Social Philosophy
in the University of London

CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE vi
I THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1
II THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE SOPHISTS 17
III PLATO'S THEORY OF THE IDEAL STATE 24
IV ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF THE BEST POSSIBLE STATE 37
V POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN ARISTOTLE AND
MACHIAVELLI 47
VI MACHIAVELLI ON THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT 54
VII HOBBES'S THEORY OF THE RATIONAL STATE 61
VIII LOCKE'S THEORY OF THE MORAL STATE 73
IX ROUSSEAU'S THEORY OF THE GENERAL WILL 82
X HUME AND BURKE ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF
CONSERVATISM 92
XI HEGEL'S IDEALIST THEORY OF THE STATE 100
XII THE UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF BENTHAM AND MILL 109
XIII MARXISM, COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM 123
XIV POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 140
XV THE JUSTIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT 151
INDEX 161

CHAPTER I
The Nature and Scope of Political Philosophy
Until the beginning of the present century philosophy was generally regarded as a source
of knowledge which transcended, both in scope and certainty, the discoveries of natural
science. Science, it was agreed, marked an advance on the uncritical and often unrelated
beliefs of ordinary life, yet it was itself based on the observations of the senses and consisted
of the uncertain generalizations based upon them; whereas philosophy was assumed
to answer questions about such subjects as the existence of God, the nature of knowledge,
and the authority of the moral law upon which sense-experience, from its very nature, could
throw no light. On such subjects, it was believed, reason was alone competent to pronounce
and, when it did so, its conclusions were characterized by a logical and universal certainty
which the generalizations of natural science could never claim.
That philosophical knowledge is certain and indubitable is a claim which, in a broad
sense, all philosophers have made, or at least implied; and if a short and simple definition
of philosophy were sought the title of the late Professor Dewey 龚 GirTord Lectures—The
Quest for Certainty'—might serve as a starting point at least For all philosophers have
claimed, or at least implied, that philosophical knowledge not only is, but must be, true.
But this general agreement has not prevented fundamental differences of opinion regarding
the nature and scope of such knowledge; and since these differences are reflected in the
application of philosophy to the problems of political theory it is important to be aware,
however generally, of their nature.
The different conceptions of philosophy ultimately depend upon different conceptions
of the nature of indubitable knowledge. The propositions of mathematics are usually cited
as typical illustrations of such knowledge. For example, the proposition "Two plus two
equals four1 is said to be necessarily and universally true on the ground that, once we have
grasped its meaning, we recognize that it must be necessarily and universally true, and
because further instances of its truth do not increase our certainty that it must always be
true. Its falsity, in other words, is inconceivable. On the other hand, there are numerous
propositions of which the falsity is perfectly conceivable. It may be true that The cat is
blackK or that "Poliomyelitis is caused by a vims', but these propositions are not necessarily
true. On the contrary, their falsity is perfectly conceivable, even if observation appears to
confirm their truth.
Analytic and Synthetic Propositions
The distinction just illustrated is variously referred to as the distinction between rational
and empirical knowledge, or between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, or between
truths of reason and truths of fact And it is generally true to say that all philosophers have
claimed, or at least implied, that their theories are rational and a priori. Where they have
differed is in their view of the scope of such knowledge. And the main difference has been
that some have held that rational knowledge is always analytic, while others have held that
it is sometimes synthetic.

The difference between analytic and synthetic propositions was defined by the German
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) as follows: Analytic propositions, he said, 'add
nothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely break it up into those
constituent concepts that have all along been thought in it, although confusedly', while synthetic
judgments 'add to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any
wise thought in it, and which no analysis could possibly extract from it'.1 The difference is,
in short, that the predicate in an analytic proposition is contained within the meaning of the
subject, while in a synthetic proposition the predicate is not contained within the meaning
of the subject but adds something related to it. Kant illustrated the difference by the two
propositions 'All bodies are extended' and 'All bodies are heavy'. The former, he thought,
is analytic, because the concept of 'extension' is part of the meaning of 'body', while the
latter is synthetic because the concept of 'heaviness' is not part of the meaning of 'body',
but only a quality which it acquires when it is placed in a gravitational field.
Kant's definition drew attention to an important difference between analytic and synthetic
propositions, although not all analytic propositions naturally fall into the simple subject-
predicate form which his examples illustrate. The essential characteristic of an analytic
proposition is that it defines the meaning, or part of the meaning, of its subject and does
not describe unessential features which may, or may not, belong to it A cube of iron has a
certain weight at sea level, a smaller weight at the top of a high mountain, and no weight at
all at a certain point between the earth and the moon; but these differences are not essential
elements in the meaning of the description 'cube of iron'. It is clear, on the other hand,
that if the cube of iron had no extension it would not be a cube of iron, since extension is
an essential part of the meaning of the phrase 'cube of iron'. In other words, to deny an
analytic proposition is self-contradictory since that is simultaneously asserting and denying
the same thing. It is, to borrow Bertrand Russell's example, like saying 'A bald man is
not bald'.1
Modern philosophers have devoted much attention to the study of analytic propositions,
and many would agree with Professor Ayer that 'a proposition is analytic when its validity
depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains',2 and that this is so because
analytic propositions 'do not make any assertion about the empirical world They simply
record our determination to use words in a certain fashion.'3 They are, in other words, tautologies;
and the reason why we think it worth while to assert them and sometimes, as in
mathematics, to draw elaborate deductions from them, is that our reason is too limited to
recognize their full significance without going through these complex verbal processes.
These considerations may appear to be extremely abstract and their connection with
what is commonly understood as 'political philosophy' far from obvious; but in fact this
connection is both simple and fundamental. For philosophy is the 'quest for certainty', and
if certainty is a characteristic of propositions, then an inquiry into the nature and scope of
1 Critique of Pure Reason, Second Edition, Introduction.
1 The Problems of Philosophy, p. 129.
2 Language, Truth, and Logic, Second Edition, p. 78.
J op. cit, p. 84.

certain, i.e. a priori, propositions must be the essential task of all philosophy. If, in other
words, the general object of philosophy is to discover the nature and implications of rational
thinking, then an enquiry into the nature of the propositions by which rational thinking
is expressed is necessarily one of the most important tasks of philosophy so understood
All philosophers who have recognized the distinction between analytic and synthetic
propositions have agreed that analytic propositions are necessary and a priori. Controversy
has centred on the question whether synthetic propositions may also sometimes be a priori.
And the different answers given to this question have determined very different conceptions
of the scope and purpose of philosophy. For if the propositions of philosophy must
always be a priori, and a priori propositions must always be analytic, it follows that the
propositions of philosophy must always be analytic.
Now one important class of proposition which is never analytic is the class of existential
propositions, i.e. propositions asserting something of the real world. While it is necessarily
true that 2 plus 2 equals 4, it is not necessarily true that there are four distinguishable
objects in the real world. For example, if I have £2 in one pocket and £2 in another, it necessarily
follows that I have £4. in both pockets, but it is for empirical observation to ascertain
whether in fact I have £2 in one pocket and £2 in another pocket This simple example illustrates
the important principle that analytic propositions apply only in a hypothetical sense
to the real world. No analytic proposition of the form BA is BI can be asserted categorically
of the real world. It can only be asserted in the hypothetical form 'If X (some existing
thing) is A then it must be B.' But the proposition asserting that X is in fact A is synthetic
and cannot be necessarily true unless synthetic propositions can be a priori
Thus if a priori propositions are always analytic, philosophy will be unable to demonstrate
the truth of any proposition about the existing world except in so far as it is logically
implied by an existential proposition whose truth has been established (if it can be established)
by empirical observation. The function of philosophy, in other words, will be to
examine the implications of propositions and not to demonstrate their truth.
As already mentioned, however, it was widely believed until some fifty years ago that
philosophy could establish facts about the existing world quite independently of experience.
Philosophy was, indeed, often looked to for a rational justification of beliefs, such
as religious or moral beliefs, already held on non-rational grounds, and it was assumed
that this justification could be given independently of experience. But during the present
century there has been a strong reaction from these methods and a growing acceptance of
the alternative view that the function of philosophy is to clarify rather than to extend the
content of human knowledge.
The theory that a priori thinking can never by itself establish a truth about the existing
world is known as Empiricism, since it always asserts that such propositions can be
established only by empirical observation. The alternative theory that a priori thinking can
by itself establish truths about the existing world is known as Rationalism. And it is clear
from the preceding discussion that Rationalism can be defended only if synthetic a priori
propositions are possible. For if such propositions are not possible no proposition about the
existing world can be established a priori, and some form of Empiricism must therefore
be accepted

Before the present century, when the doctrine has received wide support, the most celebrated
exponent of Empiricism was the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776),
now generally recognized to have been one of the greatest philosophers of all time. Hume
held that the only propositions which are certainly true are those which describe Z relations
of ideas', by which he meant analytic relationships in the sense defined above. Those
which describe "matters of factJ, i.e. synthetic propositions, cannot be rationally justified,
although they can be accepted as true in so far as they are justified by direct observation.
But of course the great majority of synthetic propositions—in particular, the socalled
'laws' of science—go far beyond this and make assertions which cannot be justified by
experience.
Thus Hume argued that the belief in the universal truth of scientific laws follows
repeated observations of the sequences which they describe; but he denied that there is any
necessity in these sequences, or even in the occurrence of the belief that they are universal
and necessary. If I infer that, because all observed samples of arsenic have proved to be
poisonous, therefore all samples whatsoever are poisonous, no logical justification of this
inference can, according to Hume, be given. It is just a fact that, following on the observation
of numerous samples of arsenic which prove to be poisonous, everybody believes
that all samples whatsoever will prove to be poisonous. But there is, according to Hume,
no rational justification for this belief; it just happens to occur following on experience of
the effects of arsenic in a limited number of instances, and just happens to have proved a
reliable guide in practice. There is no guarantee that it will prove to be true of all instances
whatsoever. Thus there is nothing R reasonable' in the belief in the a priori sense.
Hume reached the same sceptical conclusions about the general propositions of morality.
He thought it obvious that these propositions are synthetic, and argued that they cannot
therefore be a priori Such propositions as E Jealousy is evilT or O Lying is wrongD are,
he thought, obviously synthetic in that their predicates are not part of the meaning of the
subjects. And such propositions cannot be a priori, for no necessary connection can, in his
view, be discerned between the subject and the predicate. Hence the basis for these moral
generalizations must be the same as the basis for the generalizations of natural science—
the observation of a limited number of instances. And this is not a rational ground for
asserting them.
Having denied that moral generalizations have any logical necessity, Hume set himself
to analyse the empirical evidence on which they are based. He reached the conclusion that
the basis of such generalizations is a peculiar type of sentiment or feeling. When I say
"Honesty is goodS I am, according to Hume, saying, in a rather specific sense of the word
'likeR, i Like honestyQ. I am, in fact, describing not an inherent quality of honesty but a feeling
excited in me by the contemplation of honesty. This feeling Hume called the 'pleasing
sentiment of approbationI. He thought that moral disapproval in the same way expresses a
sentiment of disapprobation. Thus Hume concluded that there is nothing "rationalF or "logicalB
in morality and that it is impossible to show, on a priori grounds, that moral propositions
are true or false. Their truth or falsity depends on the purely empirical question
whether they are or are not accurate descriptions of the feelings to which they relate.
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