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AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY A R M MURRAY ebook 电子书代购

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY A R M MURRAY ebook 电子书代购

AN INTRODUCTION TO
& _. w( t) ^$ _; [' l+ Y2 R, LPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY+ x9 \  f2 k' z$ Z4 p# u/ |1 g
by
4 p" F( G9 I' V4 c& T( P7 H5 GA.R.M.MURRAY, M.A., PH.D.
5 r8 j6 J/ C$ j+ EExtension Lecturer in Social Philosophy2 n4 t% O* @7 w: r# w+ S
in the University of London
' R" ?3 x% A6 v( i
: [+ J4 u9 T7 r2 H4 n+ L5 tCONTENTS
9 F; u' I+ q4 w2 T3 pPAGE3 H& X, M" J5 |, x# z
PREFACE vi9 _0 ^5 [$ g; N
I THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1
4 f1 |/ w3 ]$ |* UII THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE SOPHISTS 17
. n3 r6 d  e% Y! @7 d, @III PLATO'S THEORY OF THE IDEAL STATE 244 N6 L$ [/ T& ]5 }/ f
IV ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF THE BEST POSSIBLE STATE 37
9 Z# V2 d# q3 t1 {0 O( q* a6 jV POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN ARISTOTLE AND
9 ^5 U8 f' n/ S, V* FMACHIAVELLI 473 R7 U/ g3 L* ~$ R5 o0 e
VI MACHIAVELLI ON THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT 54# |/ n( g# `  l" |4 j1 l- r1 ]
VII HOBBES'S THEORY OF THE RATIONAL STATE 61
8 e' m) V" Z$ p4 p' F- a3 CVIII LOCKE'S THEORY OF THE MORAL STATE 73
! O4 t1 O; w5 J, y& C' NIX ROUSSEAU'S THEORY OF THE GENERAL WILL 82. _* Z1 u2 A( n
X HUME AND BURKE ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF
; s) n1 g! K) A$ `: K' ICONSERVATISM 92
: |4 p, g, v8 m% p+ U# GXI HEGEL'S IDEALIST THEORY OF THE STATE 100
6 z$ [  P! i( ]+ cXII THE UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF BENTHAM AND MILL 109
7 z; V4 V0 x4 |0 O  qXIII MARXISM, COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM 123& j. A" s2 W" m. z( m. V& c( r
XIV POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 140( Z/ m$ L3 T  V6 F6 `8 Q
XV THE JUSTIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT 151
6 ]; ?' S# g* L0 c' o, `7 g! u+ O  GINDEX 161
/ R& h' ]" u, N3 S0 a0 q
0 ?' t( t! Z4 R$ WCHAPTER I9 Y; _* l& ~4 x1 G) P* K
The Nature and Scope of Political Philosophy
5 L6 v" r6 r) o+ U: T$ T' GUntil the beginning of the present century philosophy was generally regarded as a source
8 s, b/ e- Q# q% [) Bof knowledge which transcended, both in scope and certainty, the discoveries of natural  ^0 C; N; Q) ]7 g5 D% g4 O, j- a
science. Science, it was agreed, marked an advance on the uncritical and often unrelated
4 X) F/ |# Z9 f5 z$ G% G% fbeliefs of ordinary life, yet it was itself based on the observations of the senses and consisted
/ _* }$ L! e6 r8 C' ~of the uncertain generalizations based upon them; whereas philosophy was assumed
0 r* v$ t! H4 i" y% x2 w8 Nto answer questions about such subjects as the existence of God, the nature of knowledge,
4 Q* x, C( f0 i/ p) W$ m0 b% M: oand the authority of the moral law upon which sense-experience, from its very nature, could6 S  i1 a  L0 X: a# ^' m: m% ~# Q; c
throw no light. On such subjects, it was believed, reason was alone competent to pronounce$ d+ b) c7 b3 a+ z) n4 M8 b0 X
and, when it did so, its conclusions were characterized by a logical and universal certainty
; W& ^4 l+ |( o, Y4 N/ e2 D6 lwhich the generalizations of natural science could never claim.
- |: Z# f$ b2 m% i) P: x7 R/ p6 t4 UThat philosophical knowledge is certain and indubitable is a claim which, in a broad6 q6 X; ]6 j5 t2 t5 Z- M
sense, all philosophers have made, or at least implied; and if a short and simple definition
. f% K- f& P# a, h% a' Yof philosophy were sought the title of the late Professor Dewey 李 GirTord Lectures—The0 I# B0 p0 T. d5 u* v5 R! ^
Quest for Certainty'—might serve as a starting point at least For all philosophers have9 h* i! b9 B" @8 t, J9 w
claimed, or at least implied, that philosophical knowledge not only is, but must be, true.: v& v8 I5 N* P) M
But this general agreement has not prevented fundamental differences of opinion regarding6 Z5 f; p: W; X5 Y
the nature and scope of such knowledge; and since these differences are reflected in the3 Y, I% G9 R" Y# [/ y. W$ }: N
application of philosophy to the problems of political theory it is important to be aware,
6 I" S& K( z" h3 u- {6 A' Z4 nhowever generally, of their nature.; o: g: u  u8 ~
The different conceptions of philosophy ultimately depend upon different conceptions
4 _' q  A& B2 z! Bof the nature of indubitable knowledge. The propositions of mathematics are usually cited
. Q( `8 U( y/ X5 Aas typical illustrations of such knowledge. For example, the proposition "Two plus two  A: ]( G! b' B9 ]5 Z6 u9 F
equals four1 is said to be necessarily and universally true on the ground that, once we have
3 o2 h, c' X  Y# F8 f- x# dgrasped its meaning, we recognize that it must be necessarily and universally true, and. Y; B% \( o3 ^
because further instances of its truth do not increase our certainty that it must always be
6 O  q% O! p/ L/ `% {3 ]* [, atrue. Its falsity, in other words, is inconceivable. On the other hand, there are numerous
* X% b! ~$ T- M* n% E) Vpropositions of which the falsity is perfectly conceivable. It may be true that The cat is
+ o; x9 M/ D- _8 q9 I9 b' EblackF or that "Poliomyelitis is caused by a vims', but these propositions are not necessarily
( O3 x! Y. ?/ ^6 [" ], gtrue. On the contrary, their falsity is perfectly conceivable, even if observation appears to9 q6 o( p/ W& Z2 f, J) T% [
confirm their truth.
: |% M3 I7 [3 X* [5 a# oAnalytic and Synthetic Propositions6 T1 n; _! ^9 H& O: K2 F. V& @
The distinction just illustrated is variously referred to as the distinction between rational- X% R4 s: h( ?
and empirical knowledge, or between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, or between
& D, A5 g% x1 T! |' I, E: Qtruths of reason and truths of fact And it is generally true to say that all philosophers have
9 V9 s" S7 z2 [6 J( E* m. r3 Xclaimed, or at least implied, that their theories are rational and a priori. Where they have8 ]% e$ A- N9 r  u5 o: u* m
differed is in their view of the scope of such knowledge. And the main difference has been7 G% e* J9 c( a8 B8 e
that some have held that rational knowledge is always analytic, while others have held that
3 [' e* h4 p* \5 y; e- c9 h/ kit is sometimes synthetic.! }4 b0 \% Y& M8 s
2 o7 f' }- c& P* r3 z; X
The difference between analytic and synthetic propositions was defined by the German
. z: ?5 Z) K8 zphilosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) as follows: Analytic propositions, he said, 'add9 ]5 I+ l# O8 ^9 K4 k
nothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely break it up into those: J' K# c) i9 |1 x, o. A
constituent concepts that have all along been thought in it, although confusedly', while synthetic6 s2 h0 ?6 U$ U9 v2 p5 v
judgments 'add to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any
# x3 K# F+ J+ G5 W& ~  @: {+ pwise thought in it, and which no analysis could possibly extract from it'.1 The difference is,
8 T) J$ }& J0 M% t+ W. Ain short, that the predicate in an analytic proposition is contained within the meaning of the
. [. f" y; X+ M8 Psubject, while in a synthetic proposition the predicate is not contained within the meaning
7 p/ a. [% O. \* Vof the subject but adds something related to it. Kant illustrated the difference by the two
1 m9 y! n8 F' Epropositions 'All bodies are extended' and 'All bodies are heavy'. The former, he thought,5 K% D' Z- V3 e
is analytic, because the concept of 'extension' is part of the meaning of 'body', while the
. v4 ^2 f7 r, D8 P- Ylatter is synthetic because the concept of 'heaviness' is not part of the meaning of 'body',8 K3 \( L( d# A4 |& x
but only a quality which it acquires when it is placed in a gravitational field.
: `, {  k+ h& ~7 Q# zKant's definition drew attention to an important difference between analytic and synthetic
- D- |2 V0 c0 s, F# ?propositions, although not all analytic propositions naturally fall into the simple subject-  j0 U0 j' v& b6 S1 w/ p% l* X
predicate form which his examples illustrate. The essential characteristic of an analytic
3 d, e' I$ ?8 g9 P$ tproposition is that it defines the meaning, or part of the meaning, of its subject and does
* r0 c1 W* q- l5 e5 j  xnot describe unessential features which may, or may not, belong to it A cube of iron has a
7 W8 c; P0 v9 F1 f: Y; F; i. a! zcertain weight at sea level, a smaller weight at the top of a high mountain, and no weight at- H, q% e% {; i: U. Q- G1 p
all at a certain point between the earth and the moon; but these differences are not essential+ |; D- X* ~& j4 s/ Y6 Y5 w
elements in the meaning of the description 'cube of iron'. It is clear, on the other hand,
* v- z0 o! R9 J( n& b8 I) o/ I3 Ethat if the cube of iron had no extension it would not be a cube of iron, since extension is0 j" ?6 G; b' O5 Y1 l5 q$ `3 O
an essential part of the meaning of the phrase 'cube of iron'. In other words, to deny an
: o9 s% o" u- ?; T9 g% Fanalytic proposition is self-contradictory since that is simultaneously asserting and denying1 N' L) i* v4 A/ K
the same thing. It is, to borrow Bertrand Russell's example, like saying 'A bald man is- C. C& x. C7 i( J' v. y
not bald'.1
# P+ \1 b* {1 \Modern philosophers have devoted much attention to the study of analytic propositions,
8 m4 T2 u8 o8 z9 F% A+ l9 Tand many would agree with Professor Ayer that 'a proposition is analytic when its validity
% m7 U! n! s" x& Wdepends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains',2 and that this is so because
* A5 t6 s. o! L7 p2 x1 X) Danalytic propositions 'do not make any assertion about the empirical world They simply
+ q% z+ u4 B7 i- \) \record our determination to use words in a certain fashion.'3 They are, in other words, tautologies;0 k4 B3 T8 ]$ }5 U
and the reason why we think it worth while to assert them and sometimes, as in
1 \. I8 S& s; E2 _mathematics, to draw elaborate deductions from them, is that our reason is too limited to$ N2 J/ t( l, J& L$ Y* |$ D/ Q0 i# Y
recognize their full significance without going through these complex verbal processes.  R: Z0 D% X6 _; {: d
These considerations may appear to be extremely abstract and their connection with
; A0 t3 l/ [! j* ]! J" ]+ cwhat is commonly understood as 'political philosophy' far from obvious; but in fact this
  D4 V, K/ M+ i# `connection is both simple and fundamental. For philosophy is the 'quest for certainty', and5 r0 q7 \7 i/ O5 o
if certainty is a characteristic of propositions, then an inquiry into the nature and scope of' X3 Q# x5 C1 f6 |1 N
1 Critique of Pure Reason, Second Edition, Introduction.8 }9 M3 F' ^3 K6 Y8 f( o
1 The Problems of Philosophy, p. 129.
6 B: }* {% j8 P2 |* |8 o* |6 h6 N2 Language, Truth, and Logic, Second Edition, p. 78.$ H( L' q' Y' \+ }8 @1 u. h$ b- ^
J op. cit, p. 84.
1 u) d: }# k. H. O! F- {" p% [, N) O0 ?  z- {* o
certain, i.e. a priori, propositions must be the essential task of all philosophy. If, in other; A; X% y2 Q: Z1 G; C! t1 n9 l
words, the general object of philosophy is to discover the nature and implications of rational
; ^. A+ I2 v/ l( X$ ithinking, then an enquiry into the nature of the propositions by which rational thinking
' Y7 A6 U6 O5 Nis expressed is necessarily one of the most important tasks of philosophy so understood
3 |6 s2 p& l5 ]& }- ^0 P" q1 l: Z  ZAll philosophers who have recognized the distinction between analytic and synthetic
7 Q. ?. x. u' R/ B  J" epropositions have agreed that analytic propositions are necessary and a priori. Controversy. @7 P7 P" h/ B) \: U4 o
has centred on the question whether synthetic propositions may also sometimes be a priori.
* B/ t" j8 q" w  tAnd the different answers given to this question have determined very different conceptions
. Q% ]4 F! d) H& W- hof the scope and purpose of philosophy. For if the propositions of philosophy must
# n, w9 [1 R  falways be a priori, and a priori propositions must always be analytic, it follows that the
; u' t) k' c. B4 p8 O8 j1 e6 Ppropositions of philosophy must always be analytic.
1 ^/ i* ~2 [2 a7 kNow one important class of proposition which is never analytic is the class of existential8 D2 T) z+ `6 M+ y  |' Z
propositions, i.e. propositions asserting something of the real world. While it is necessarily7 T9 x. c  a* }- |
true that 2 plus 2 equals 4, it is not necessarily true that there are four distinguishable8 D, {+ j; A& j
objects in the real world. For example, if I have £2 in one pocket and £2 in another, it necessarily: V( b1 z( v: d  L3 C5 M; E& w6 u
follows that I have £4. in both pockets, but it is for empirical observation to ascertain- G7 P) ^  w. Q6 y
whether in fact I have £2 in one pocket and £2 in another pocket This simple example illustrates
$ Y# v* q$ I; P6 h# K, B1 Pthe important principle that analytic propositions apply only in a hypothetical sense- i. O5 B# O8 {
to the real world. No analytic proposition of the form HA is BE can be asserted categorically
% B( T/ Z5 j$ ]+ i5 Dof the real world. It can only be asserted in the hypothetical form 'If X (some existing( E1 z: b' _& X/ E* n, K5 W
thing) is A then it must be B.' But the proposition asserting that X is in fact A is synthetic; y# w6 ?$ \# w1 [7 R
and cannot be necessarily true unless synthetic propositions can be a priori
1 C; ^4 G: `) O5 d, q7 E+ ~1 uThus if a priori propositions are always analytic, philosophy will be unable to demonstrate
3 Q2 e6 a9 B, }# u& z5 kthe truth of any proposition about the existing world except in so far as it is logically, _" l: M% N9 V; ?! r- H6 w( y
implied by an existential proposition whose truth has been established (if it can be established)6 D0 ]! d( E0 d; p& B
by empirical observation. The function of philosophy, in other words, will be to
9 ~) i9 J/ r; }$ {, kexamine the implications of propositions and not to demonstrate their truth.& f8 W/ b5 R6 D. [3 s
As already mentioned, however, it was widely believed until some fifty years ago that
, P" l+ S& w6 O0 v. S4 Ophilosophy could establish facts about the existing world quite independently of experience.
8 \* {2 n/ h1 v( gPhilosophy was, indeed, often looked to for a rational justification of beliefs, such
% p9 @& b8 o: {% tas religious or moral beliefs, already held on non-rational grounds, and it was assumed
) [7 I, q) s% C2 @9 C0 Hthat this justification could be given independently of experience. But during the present7 y# S1 p  m& t( ?
century there has been a strong reaction from these methods and a growing acceptance of0 u7 l- h. w7 C% Z/ V% u; t8 x
the alternative view that the function of philosophy is to clarify rather than to extend the, D. w1 E, U+ b/ p1 n2 C3 r) t
content of human knowledge.
7 _7 B1 J$ j" U* }The theory that a priori thinking can never by itself establish a truth about the existing+ U) `$ Z& w) T4 [
world is known as Empiricism, since it always asserts that such propositions can be
# ~3 N9 b* ^1 o' sestablished only by empirical observation. The alternative theory that a priori thinking can
( S1 t* h1 |7 H( ~/ \+ Wby itself establish truths about the existing world is known as Rationalism. And it is clear( t; v1 y, K% X; n( c+ K5 V
from the preceding discussion that Rationalism can be defended only if synthetic a priori+ ]0 s/ l/ ]+ m9 h' H0 l( h
propositions are possible. For if such propositions are not possible no proposition about the
- X, h$ ]! b2 j6 j; q6 kexisting world can be established a priori, and some form of Empiricism must therefore
2 g2 M2 m' o( n4 Y6 kbe accepted
. c$ Q/ N: `2 O  b4 M: V4 K8 z2 b6 I+ [! a' b8 S
Before the present century, when the doctrine has received wide support, the most celebrated
/ g# t0 `0 J) m# N9 q& Eexponent of Empiricism was the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776),, |. y! l: I+ x& t; H; S  _+ h" B
now generally recognized to have been one of the greatest philosophers of all time. Hume
# H4 V/ \8 h! ~8 Q8 Y$ hheld that the only propositions which are certainly true are those which describe C relations- }$ Q9 l' Q4 ]
of ideas', by which he meant analytic relationships in the sense defined above. Those
4 f( {! a+ l: b" ~6 Owhich describe "matters of factU, i.e. synthetic propositions, cannot be rationally justified,8 @+ b. R: ?& k) R+ ]* w6 P; E
although they can be accepted as true in so far as they are justified by direct observation.
- _0 s! b% z0 [4 J: y1 q  [0 fBut of course the great majority of synthetic propositions—in particular, the socalled
, v( d1 U' u2 _1 o' i'laws' of science—go far beyond this and make assertions which cannot be justified by
. G3 R- E& l2 `' f# gexperience.
; g6 O" w- n+ lThus Hume argued that the belief in the universal truth of scientific laws follows7 i! Q: j6 m* j* r( K: R: a/ c
repeated observations of the sequences which they describe; but he denied that there is any
1 m. L: o" |( j' o+ ynecessity in these sequences, or even in the occurrence of the belief that they are universal
4 `8 ~" X* O0 E1 Uand necessary. If I infer that, because all observed samples of arsenic have proved to be# F; q/ m$ r, d& L9 C9 \
poisonous, therefore all samples whatsoever are poisonous, no logical justification of this3 a& g/ [# S5 P% e9 B! J2 h$ ^/ ], y
inference can, according to Hume, be given. It is just a fact that, following on the observation$ _6 J* h% y5 ]! E0 {
of numerous samples of arsenic which prove to be poisonous, everybody believes6 x2 m  E% ]9 X* |: Z
that all samples whatsoever will prove to be poisonous. But there is, according to Hume,! h7 v9 F1 `5 Z
no rational justification for this belief; it just happens to occur following on experience of7 \) [& M- S  S, z" o9 Q
the effects of arsenic in a limited number of instances, and just happens to have proved a
& l6 A$ p4 Q7 V- D7 o) qreliable guide in practice. There is no guarantee that it will prove to be true of all instances
; }  c( k5 u4 n3 ?4 I" r. Q2 K9 Mwhatsoever. Thus there is nothing M reasonable' in the belief in the a priori sense.
) J$ A& S: r3 {Hume reached the same sceptical conclusions about the general propositions of morality.
2 z' k) F4 v4 ?5 `He thought it obvious that these propositions are synthetic, and argued that they cannot
  X* n" ?% |+ X) N6 U, H5 n; u. Etherefore be a priori Such propositions as S Jealousy is evilK or Y Lying is wrongQ are," z( h  w2 g# \$ G( E3 {8 O
he thought, obviously synthetic in that their predicates are not part of the meaning of the% W7 c* S0 m; |9 ]9 G9 v& V4 Y
subjects. And such propositions cannot be a priori, for no necessary connection can, in his  A; ?# E' ^5 O( `8 R, W
view, be discerned between the subject and the predicate. Hence the basis for these moral
2 u8 W2 x. N# |7 [generalizations must be the same as the basis for the generalizations of natural science—
0 S7 v) R# M# nthe observation of a limited number of instances. And this is not a rational ground for
) G- y' a: w4 [( r3 b, s* ?asserting them.' u3 S* P7 `* R  W* T5 h' B
Having denied that moral generalizations have any logical necessity, Hume set himself9 D! t1 E$ X% S; b  s- I* ]
to analyse the empirical evidence on which they are based. He reached the conclusion that
) U" b7 t" B) T5 s2 B- Cthe basis of such generalizations is a peculiar type of sentiment or feeling. When I say
9 P: e" R  h8 J. F"Honesty is goodK I am, according to Hume, saying, in a rather specific sense of the word
6 R8 n  V3 b- w8 X& v( G'likeK, i Like honestyK. I am, in fact, describing not an inherent quality of honesty but a feeling
+ k; R, V. |( Y2 Q/ Eexcited in me by the contemplation of honesty. This feeling Hume called the 'pleasing
  |. g) @, B6 o! r, hsentiment of approbationP. He thought that moral disapproval in the same way expresses a6 v. m0 r6 O+ G9 p4 c1 ]! h" K- U
sentiment of disapprobation. Thus Hume concluded that there is nothing "rationalW or "logicalN: Y; n4 D, Z. Z1 w
in morality and that it is impossible to show, on a priori grounds, that moral propositions
5 A1 n& D( o5 d- v# e( O0 Vare true or false. Their truth or falsity depends on the purely empirical question- w; r& l5 \5 h0 ?
whether they are or are not accurate descriptions of the feelings to which they relate.
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