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AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY A R M MURRAY ebook 电子书代购

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY A R M MURRAY ebook 电子书代购

AN INTRODUCTION TO3 s, n" ~9 p# h6 W  }; o
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY  ~! ^6 w. W, t1 g9 H! _
by
+ z. k; S6 A" ^" |" b: C/ Z( L) lA.R.M.MURRAY, M.A., PH.D.$ c8 P; L' U" z  D+ ]5 e
Extension Lecturer in Social Philosophy+ }) \. i! z2 `* L( w' w; W4 v
in the University of London
: F4 e% t+ u# M7 I( _* k5 Q% g- n- G) F
CONTENTS
9 e7 W4 s, w9 n* R  @4 y% k$ CPAGE
( `8 B8 T+ J% R) t/ ZPREFACE vi( u/ J/ k& N! c1 C1 l, P
I THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1
2 w) O# ?& g' p5 f0 o4 pII THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE SOPHISTS 17* d* G# V7 }+ t3 E! ?! h6 d# z$ h, z
III PLATO'S THEORY OF THE IDEAL STATE 24) M: C  p! U4 L! E7 N* b
IV ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF THE BEST POSSIBLE STATE 37
% q+ Z& j! i) u. s, ?4 E0 ZV POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN ARISTOTLE AND
: l$ h1 w# Z. s. f* r6 j7 o; cMACHIAVELLI 470 z% q9 s- i9 T; \6 Z7 ], D; F
VI MACHIAVELLI ON THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT 546 l+ N# h1 i  N
VII HOBBES'S THEORY OF THE RATIONAL STATE 61
8 Y/ T' ~7 \. i. V* F3 _VIII LOCKE'S THEORY OF THE MORAL STATE 73! S! W3 d: |  U6 R
IX ROUSSEAU'S THEORY OF THE GENERAL WILL 822 D! y5 k; ~7 W6 U% A& ]2 k- w: l
X HUME AND BURKE ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF$ w) b" Q& R7 F; W
CONSERVATISM 92& f5 A8 [; `* c* D3 ?
XI HEGEL'S IDEALIST THEORY OF THE STATE 100
$ v* B/ x  _. q  J& uXII THE UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF BENTHAM AND MILL 109
- u' w9 [) N' f" PXIII MARXISM, COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM 123
8 J5 S8 V$ I- v! q0 G& Y  t( kXIV POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 140  d$ A; ^8 E$ u" m5 b& }1 r0 u
XV THE JUSTIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT 151
" }- \6 c$ D8 \) N% @: a/ @! }* AINDEX 161
+ U( b! G# d0 ?1 B; H- V
4 l% |1 H6 {7 b3 D0 P: h7 kCHAPTER I0 c; r( J/ u2 d1 X" k
The Nature and Scope of Political Philosophy
/ W7 A7 B4 o+ e" qUntil the beginning of the present century philosophy was generally regarded as a source
. U" |" @* b3 wof knowledge which transcended, both in scope and certainty, the discoveries of natural; }5 b1 P5 T- ^' h& O
science. Science, it was agreed, marked an advance on the uncritical and often unrelated: B! S3 P1 ^1 k4 g  `+ }
beliefs of ordinary life, yet it was itself based on the observations of the senses and consisted; s& K' y( d3 R, `& B1 L
of the uncertain generalizations based upon them; whereas philosophy was assumed
! v/ W6 {: ^% g( h3 `$ g0 pto answer questions about such subjects as the existence of God, the nature of knowledge,
  `3 m/ L% O6 ]& g5 aand the authority of the moral law upon which sense-experience, from its very nature, could
; k& w, [# s6 d8 ^  ~throw no light. On such subjects, it was believed, reason was alone competent to pronounce
0 j  W( L: B' d* R/ kand, when it did so, its conclusions were characterized by a logical and universal certainty& l0 \3 C+ `1 ]& R6 {: I* E
which the generalizations of natural science could never claim.: ]! @9 `# H$ t% G
That philosophical knowledge is certain and indubitable is a claim which, in a broad
; f" ^9 Z4 N( w  Y# _sense, all philosophers have made, or at least implied; and if a short and simple definition9 S7 S4 I! T2 x) t) z3 X2 R3 p$ M, p, m
of philosophy were sought the title of the late Professor Dewey 李 GirTord Lectures—The
/ {( M8 |4 f4 O  nQuest for Certainty'—might serve as a starting point at least For all philosophers have# e1 q5 z' T+ d' P& O. E1 [/ G
claimed, or at least implied, that philosophical knowledge not only is, but must be, true.
( R8 x1 p) N0 z5 J) _' \. J. MBut this general agreement has not prevented fundamental differences of opinion regarding
; m# N* u2 M2 D/ `( p7 Tthe nature and scope of such knowledge; and since these differences are reflected in the
$ m. \; f; W0 G4 gapplication of philosophy to the problems of political theory it is important to be aware,9 p- Z/ Y( Y& P% g
however generally, of their nature.. p2 b$ \/ R4 M; }
The different conceptions of philosophy ultimately depend upon different conceptions
/ @) S( L' \+ I: }of the nature of indubitable knowledge. The propositions of mathematics are usually cited! h& f: I; t$ G7 K0 {$ Q
as typical illustrations of such knowledge. For example, the proposition "Two plus two
* a  l, _0 h# f* I* i$ kequals four1 is said to be necessarily and universally true on the ground that, once we have6 d8 y1 g- L- g* a
grasped its meaning, we recognize that it must be necessarily and universally true, and" j1 @4 V# Y9 c0 m
because further instances of its truth do not increase our certainty that it must always be6 |. x5 h( f9 D+ Z- ]
true. Its falsity, in other words, is inconceivable. On the other hand, there are numerous
) L7 F: c  l; Y0 A4 Kpropositions of which the falsity is perfectly conceivable. It may be true that The cat is
- _: U+ M5 p  SblackF or that "Poliomyelitis is caused by a vims', but these propositions are not necessarily
" f  j& [1 }% u$ htrue. On the contrary, their falsity is perfectly conceivable, even if observation appears to& ?& @) ~4 K, S- O( ~9 H
confirm their truth.
; N- r; p4 \$ PAnalytic and Synthetic Propositions6 Z/ s' c+ c7 R2 N
The distinction just illustrated is variously referred to as the distinction between rational) `% l; s+ I9 V7 y
and empirical knowledge, or between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, or between( k$ B: d, c% v% u
truths of reason and truths of fact And it is generally true to say that all philosophers have
: ^( Q: P; [. m  E1 h8 xclaimed, or at least implied, that their theories are rational and a priori. Where they have2 k# |4 x8 U1 K% \8 D- v* W
differed is in their view of the scope of such knowledge. And the main difference has been( U0 v0 o7 V# N
that some have held that rational knowledge is always analytic, while others have held that  t# Q) c: G) ~4 O, B# j" a2 S
it is sometimes synthetic.
2 P2 M! p7 i  m2 o
# G) v" k' F1 z9 j: Z' dThe difference between analytic and synthetic propositions was defined by the German
, s. u4 k- \1 j8 u# c' Qphilosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) as follows: Analytic propositions, he said, 'add8 ^! ^& x- h9 p# V/ }
nothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely break it up into those1 _, u. i; J5 X: K3 ?
constituent concepts that have all along been thought in it, although confusedly', while synthetic! W8 L- u% z6 Z& B9 S
judgments 'add to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any% C( ~" I6 R8 P5 r4 r1 {  \+ `
wise thought in it, and which no analysis could possibly extract from it'.1 The difference is,( N2 ?- N5 z4 u
in short, that the predicate in an analytic proposition is contained within the meaning of the
( S6 F; O. ^+ Z# e8 Y3 xsubject, while in a synthetic proposition the predicate is not contained within the meaning' n1 x' r, g4 d# l& C
of the subject but adds something related to it. Kant illustrated the difference by the two. R1 e  K2 \9 P! h
propositions 'All bodies are extended' and 'All bodies are heavy'. The former, he thought,
1 k8 h7 |% H: f$ Ais analytic, because the concept of 'extension' is part of the meaning of 'body', while the% v3 M; h( ^' H; M9 \: G' J
latter is synthetic because the concept of 'heaviness' is not part of the meaning of 'body',
- f! b5 e2 t' Q: T1 [$ ]( y0 J* kbut only a quality which it acquires when it is placed in a gravitational field.
  e9 Z+ O% V( \% e( ^5 RKant's definition drew attention to an important difference between analytic and synthetic
8 e9 n" `& I" S& |propositions, although not all analytic propositions naturally fall into the simple subject-5 q# D/ N$ W) P  k6 v
predicate form which his examples illustrate. The essential characteristic of an analytic
) x1 E3 O8 f$ u* Oproposition is that it defines the meaning, or part of the meaning, of its subject and does0 G+ s0 o" a6 T1 `
not describe unessential features which may, or may not, belong to it A cube of iron has a" Y3 ^' O9 N, [5 S
certain weight at sea level, a smaller weight at the top of a high mountain, and no weight at
4 B. Z0 C/ _8 |* h1 E; j' i# wall at a certain point between the earth and the moon; but these differences are not essential+ c  @& A6 i1 z7 F3 @
elements in the meaning of the description 'cube of iron'. It is clear, on the other hand,
/ ~2 |2 o! e* k) U9 w5 Dthat if the cube of iron had no extension it would not be a cube of iron, since extension is
$ T/ y0 P9 m9 K, Oan essential part of the meaning of the phrase 'cube of iron'. In other words, to deny an0 u6 ~6 J; P5 N+ B4 _( E
analytic proposition is self-contradictory since that is simultaneously asserting and denying7 B, |) ^: Q2 l* z! g6 _
the same thing. It is, to borrow Bertrand Russell's example, like saying 'A bald man is) o: Y: v5 ^+ T9 V
not bald'.1
& Q) u& u# o9 Y+ Z/ OModern philosophers have devoted much attention to the study of analytic propositions,
; K8 O& w9 w% E' ?2 v- t( I0 c: uand many would agree with Professor Ayer that 'a proposition is analytic when its validity
5 {& t' z3 X. R! _depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains',2 and that this is so because# N; q! a  ?8 E9 L1 |
analytic propositions 'do not make any assertion about the empirical world They simply
; B+ \8 k: q! A2 o6 C$ L9 @record our determination to use words in a certain fashion.'3 They are, in other words, tautologies;2 Q( D% y3 \7 D) }( t9 t% {4 g" M
and the reason why we think it worth while to assert them and sometimes, as in
. G! B7 D* F: @$ J% W( ^4 m0 Wmathematics, to draw elaborate deductions from them, is that our reason is too limited to
  f3 d1 {- c& z; S5 Rrecognize their full significance without going through these complex verbal processes.
3 |' T* H( V$ R' b( hThese considerations may appear to be extremely abstract and their connection with
2 h+ S8 n' \( y, v8 n; V8 nwhat is commonly understood as 'political philosophy' far from obvious; but in fact this
9 r1 A; a2 T8 `connection is both simple and fundamental. For philosophy is the 'quest for certainty', and
) w( l. a2 h" i5 r/ Jif certainty is a characteristic of propositions, then an inquiry into the nature and scope of
$ v" P' n# \6 b" p1 Critique of Pure Reason, Second Edition, Introduction.: s$ n. J, Y& x' J
1 The Problems of Philosophy, p. 129.9 ~$ U& d0 C9 v0 x0 _
2 Language, Truth, and Logic, Second Edition, p. 78.
$ x& l9 H6 W( uJ op. cit, p. 84.
2 H, A$ j7 `, Y0 C$ _6 |' q
' _7 D; Z2 i% ~certain, i.e. a priori, propositions must be the essential task of all philosophy. If, in other
3 o" |4 _/ n* E6 O  M% Nwords, the general object of philosophy is to discover the nature and implications of rational8 p$ m& r- d, v# Z2 W
thinking, then an enquiry into the nature of the propositions by which rational thinking
3 x( B+ ?5 u/ [6 f0 o/ S$ s4 wis expressed is necessarily one of the most important tasks of philosophy so understood
1 r! T. I  n8 ^3 ~. Q- aAll philosophers who have recognized the distinction between analytic and synthetic
/ H9 D6 Q+ b! {; f# [7 i. D) _propositions have agreed that analytic propositions are necessary and a priori. Controversy
/ i' i  w1 N) ?$ j& F7 H. @6 dhas centred on the question whether synthetic propositions may also sometimes be a priori.
, M" ^& }9 \" f9 |0 }2 MAnd the different answers given to this question have determined very different conceptions+ Q* L7 e% `; `3 _) M! I( M
of the scope and purpose of philosophy. For if the propositions of philosophy must3 X# A% v  j5 n2 _1 \9 P
always be a priori, and a priori propositions must always be analytic, it follows that the3 j1 C: {6 H  B! Y8 M- r
propositions of philosophy must always be analytic.
$ Y" l7 ~( {+ K8 tNow one important class of proposition which is never analytic is the class of existential
% t9 K9 n" F) J; L! G2 r# qpropositions, i.e. propositions asserting something of the real world. While it is necessarily# u( y+ `; e$ P2 `" W. k! Z
true that 2 plus 2 equals 4, it is not necessarily true that there are four distinguishable5 G& s* z2 j  `( O$ D- d
objects in the real world. For example, if I have £2 in one pocket and £2 in another, it necessarily" a9 u' g, y1 |: |8 J$ J2 r
follows that I have £4. in both pockets, but it is for empirical observation to ascertain
9 \' U6 D  p0 ?) F7 fwhether in fact I have £2 in one pocket and £2 in another pocket This simple example illustrates7 H  O( a. L% i0 @% u
the important principle that analytic propositions apply only in a hypothetical sense
* }8 k- M3 y7 B5 A: mto the real world. No analytic proposition of the form HA is BE can be asserted categorically
" ]5 E3 _: c9 J, k  eof the real world. It can only be asserted in the hypothetical form 'If X (some existing
: m- j/ p( m2 V' uthing) is A then it must be B.' But the proposition asserting that X is in fact A is synthetic
' n/ s  p9 N7 K1 F: i$ cand cannot be necessarily true unless synthetic propositions can be a priori3 t0 M# C) }1 j5 G: o, Q
Thus if a priori propositions are always analytic, philosophy will be unable to demonstrate$ A% X8 @6 \8 E+ @8 }: |/ p
the truth of any proposition about the existing world except in so far as it is logically/ I' K& Q9 H5 F& a6 v3 |
implied by an existential proposition whose truth has been established (if it can be established); \7 G# ^, X& @: F+ R4 L: [
by empirical observation. The function of philosophy, in other words, will be to
$ H. d# I' n( K( k4 V( A; M  q3 uexamine the implications of propositions and not to demonstrate their truth.+ Q0 V6 o: |0 ]! w/ [- `
As already mentioned, however, it was widely believed until some fifty years ago that
" m- Y! I7 P' f7 G, p; F/ _philosophy could establish facts about the existing world quite independently of experience.
) S3 K+ X+ I) H' L: @Philosophy was, indeed, often looked to for a rational justification of beliefs, such
4 K# Q9 W8 S4 B0 Mas religious or moral beliefs, already held on non-rational grounds, and it was assumed; w1 M. c( [4 M7 B: [; ^: ~
that this justification could be given independently of experience. But during the present
1 t6 A7 m0 v6 n9 X8 H  Icentury there has been a strong reaction from these methods and a growing acceptance of
5 h# m2 T" o4 f* H" `9 ?* _the alternative view that the function of philosophy is to clarify rather than to extend the
+ f# V  I* O2 K7 {7 a1 M. dcontent of human knowledge.
) G6 B  N! b# c: Y3 m5 K+ yThe theory that a priori thinking can never by itself establish a truth about the existing
4 k4 W- ^) _/ g, E. O4 E+ S# M) Iworld is known as Empiricism, since it always asserts that such propositions can be5 @9 k1 g5 ]: L
established only by empirical observation. The alternative theory that a priori thinking can9 A7 m9 R8 C; ~6 ^3 @7 [
by itself establish truths about the existing world is known as Rationalism. And it is clear
& L7 O" n! q! f6 v( afrom the preceding discussion that Rationalism can be defended only if synthetic a priori4 K1 u9 L9 I& m0 ~
propositions are possible. For if such propositions are not possible no proposition about the
- }4 Z/ W- ^3 E3 T2 \8 @existing world can be established a priori, and some form of Empiricism must therefore
3 S9 E4 y  {- N4 f5 Tbe accepted  C; i; q3 ^2 K. G8 Z4 W+ _7 L
; N: \' b# H4 h; v6 b! S( @$ \0 N/ T
Before the present century, when the doctrine has received wide support, the most celebrated. A" Y4 u# {: e. O, o
exponent of Empiricism was the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776),
# [7 c7 m, ^/ snow generally recognized to have been one of the greatest philosophers of all time. Hume
9 t/ Q: [8 l) p, p. t4 P; Z3 _held that the only propositions which are certainly true are those which describe C relations9 \; k. u1 M0 T# ?9 q. i1 I9 [
of ideas', by which he meant analytic relationships in the sense defined above. Those
. M' V5 m, K2 K+ l+ \, n* ^7 S# j" iwhich describe "matters of factU, i.e. synthetic propositions, cannot be rationally justified,8 A# l, Y- Z' W; Y0 Y: m2 q
although they can be accepted as true in so far as they are justified by direct observation.
2 I$ Q  e0 X; lBut of course the great majority of synthetic propositions—in particular, the socalled
( |' b1 P. `$ y2 S' F4 ?  j'laws' of science—go far beyond this and make assertions which cannot be justified by
2 w# n8 \- I" s; ^/ J8 E. jexperience.
  Q5 `% ~: I" n  gThus Hume argued that the belief in the universal truth of scientific laws follows' n' H2 f" X- V& c  Y+ n
repeated observations of the sequences which they describe; but he denied that there is any
, A$ F; L/ T- wnecessity in these sequences, or even in the occurrence of the belief that they are universal% P& K$ ~7 }1 b! K0 H
and necessary. If I infer that, because all observed samples of arsenic have proved to be# V& h" J/ N& [
poisonous, therefore all samples whatsoever are poisonous, no logical justification of this, W2 Q) T& S# e+ _3 \' w( a: ~
inference can, according to Hume, be given. It is just a fact that, following on the observation1 e; ^) ^' U" b8 H. J
of numerous samples of arsenic which prove to be poisonous, everybody believes
" W- j1 B3 A2 q( O7 V7 e) Vthat all samples whatsoever will prove to be poisonous. But there is, according to Hume,# y6 I, e, N8 ?* V
no rational justification for this belief; it just happens to occur following on experience of( v1 `9 {/ K( b; J; a
the effects of arsenic in a limited number of instances, and just happens to have proved a  j0 [" V$ B1 P7 f% c$ v) F
reliable guide in practice. There is no guarantee that it will prove to be true of all instances: |& X; B6 Z* I9 F4 z
whatsoever. Thus there is nothing M reasonable' in the belief in the a priori sense.
/ E0 a* s' _/ G; Y, D2 pHume reached the same sceptical conclusions about the general propositions of morality.
0 g! }" @; A) }0 s* G" W7 @: m( zHe thought it obvious that these propositions are synthetic, and argued that they cannot
* I8 z, Q5 Z( v  @therefore be a priori Such propositions as S Jealousy is evilK or Y Lying is wrongQ are,( W% e5 l$ y8 T; X* O, n$ z
he thought, obviously synthetic in that their predicates are not part of the meaning of the
) d2 A2 q- i' ]( S& j5 L* rsubjects. And such propositions cannot be a priori, for no necessary connection can, in his  o( ]& D4 U' U- L: N& i) ]
view, be discerned between the subject and the predicate. Hence the basis for these moral+ g- b! U" r* U8 l3 L% Y
generalizations must be the same as the basis for the generalizations of natural science—
( O' l7 v. i, K+ r3 ethe observation of a limited number of instances. And this is not a rational ground for* \$ J! \& a* E* i/ z
asserting them.' k3 P9 Z) z7 g  h5 H( {
Having denied that moral generalizations have any logical necessity, Hume set himself
8 @; I3 D- S1 R4 Z+ y* gto analyse the empirical evidence on which they are based. He reached the conclusion that
4 x" k6 {9 g( M+ f) c3 F# N9 cthe basis of such generalizations is a peculiar type of sentiment or feeling. When I say' p' s7 f/ u; k. Y
"Honesty is goodK I am, according to Hume, saying, in a rather specific sense of the word) O8 _/ C; x+ @9 M! [+ y8 p& X( V
'likeK, i Like honestyK. I am, in fact, describing not an inherent quality of honesty but a feeling
6 C0 h6 K% @% A( W0 A9 Bexcited in me by the contemplation of honesty. This feeling Hume called the 'pleasing# m' J6 `9 j# M( {. d" J
sentiment of approbationP. He thought that moral disapproval in the same way expresses a& w6 ^7 A: e$ F) ]- E
sentiment of disapprobation. Thus Hume concluded that there is nothing "rationalW or "logicalN
9 Y5 @5 ]+ N8 C- i$ c% Jin morality and that it is impossible to show, on a priori grounds, that moral propositions! E3 X; V" X9 H
are true or false. Their truth or falsity depends on the purely empirical question) F9 S$ V" q9 F+ C$ k9 }
whether they are or are not accurate descriptions of the feelings to which they relate.  l) N9 j+ [" V/ G* ?, R. N
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