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手植记丨花椒:中国味的脊梁

手植记丨花椒:中国味的脊梁

    在斯德哥尔摩要了一碗牛肉汤面。奶白色的汤头,整齐的苗条,和着嫩黄的白菜和火红的牛肉片,都笼罩在喷香的热气中。它们在暖暖的灯光下闪耀着诱人的色彩,不觉让人食指大动。等等!那些白菜上怎么会有黑色的颗粒。一口尝下去,果不其然,那些就是胡椒,至于汤头,虽有鲜味,但是略显空洞。这个中餐馆的越南大厨显然没有领会中餐香料的奥秘,因为他们不会也不曾使用一种中国调料——花椒。
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# @: y3 J5 ~! ]7 I+ D  如果要选出东西方餐桌的典型调味料,那非胡椒和花椒莫属。虽然中国餐桌上,花椒调味罐出现的频率不像西餐馆中的胡椒瓶,但是花椒的味道已经渗透到中餐的每一根神经之中。从五香脱骨扒鸡到椒盐虾,从红焖羊肉到侉炖大鲤鱼,都少不了花椒的味道,更不用提那些靠花椒成味的夫妻肺片,椒麻鸡,麻婆豆腐,水煮鱼等一众川菜了。$ u) Q# [7 e+ o8 t
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  在川菜盛行的今天,花椒进一步巩固了在中餐调料界的霸主地位。不光是原有的五香味和麻辣味被发扬光大。各种新的,堪称麻味加强版的麻椒,颇具清新气味的藤椒,以及出场频率越来越高的青花椒,让我们的舌尖进入新的狂欢时代。我不止一次被问到这样的问题,这些花椒为什么会有不同的味道,它们的真身究竟是谁?但是,最吸引我的问题就是,第一个吃花椒的人,为啥会去摆弄这种让舌头震颤的的植物呢?: I* g, O) r) p  ^5 H
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  从神的食物开始
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: H4 J* h/ I4 ]% |! y  虽然如今大家对麻辣香锅都分外痴迷,但是花椒一开始并没有立马摆上人的餐桌,而是在敬神的供桌上。想想也是,这种会让舌尖麻木的植物,肯定会让人提高警惕,就人体的感官原则来说,不正常的刺激都意味着危险。
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  还好,花椒不仅有麻味,还有香味。而香味在我国古代是颇受重视的特征,因为古人认为香气是给神灵最好的礼物。而花椒则同兰花、桂皮一样被视为重要的香料。在《楚辞》中,就有这样的记载,“椒,香物,所以降神”。正是在这种认识的推动下,从商周时期开始,花椒就出现在了祭祀仪式之上,这个传统一直延续到了隋唐时期。  T% d  v) f: s  T+ W% [% V( S

4 g% d2 q; q$ E" T* O  至于贡品的形式,不仅有纯的花椒粒,还有升级版的形式——花椒粒泡到酒中——制成椒酒。后来,大概是有人为了在神的贡品上沾点光,或者是为了祈求好运,开始尝试喝这些神的饮品。于是花椒总算开始跟人的肠胃打交道了。不过,直到这个时候,花椒仍然是一种象征物。而喝椒酒,更像是祭祀仪式的补充部分。
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. Q$ U- @# M) X$ j  既然花椒是神的食物,那在墓葬中更是必不可少了。在商周和秦汉时期的古墓中,都发掘出土了大量的花椒实物。虽然有学者认为,这些花椒可能是出于防腐目的添加的,但是就发现的数量而言远远达不到驱虫避菌的效果。相对而言,此处的花椒更像是生人对死者的美好祝愿。当然了,此时的花椒还是一种身份地位的象征,因为在秦汉时期还没有人工栽培花椒。所有的花椒都是从野外采集的,这需要消耗大量的人力,事实上,所有的花椒陪葬物都是在富人的墓葬中发现的,平民是无法触及这种昂贵的香料的。
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. N) {; r6 Q3 W$ u, R& n  椒宫中的辛香味9 }  q9 J0 t' q( H/ v5 p

' J: L$ G; j1 a  T* L3 d, r  在接触花椒的过程中,人们不仅让它有了敬神之责,还赋予了它其他的用途。宫廷历史剧中,我们经常听到皇后住的地方叫“椒房殿”或者叫“椒宫”,这些地方还真与花椒有关。据说,汉成帝迎娶赵飞燕之后,这位可以在手掌上跳舞的美女久久不能怀孕。于是,汉成帝命令工匠把赵飞燕寝宫的墙壁上都涂满了花椒,于是赵飞燕顺利产子,而她居住的宫殿就被称为椒宫。据说这样做的依据是,花椒的果实繁盛,用这种多子的植物来装点宫殿,也算是讨个好口彩吧。至于,花椒的气味会不会影响生育,就当是个美好的愿景吧。至少在魏晋之后,这种习俗连同“祭祀,椒酒”一并被放弃了,想来,杨贵妃的椒房殿里应该是没有花椒墙的。+ N; n1 y2 h* J- f" b5 n
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  我忽然在想,当年赵飞燕在花椒满墙的宫殿里会不会觉得憋闷,亦或是为了怀上龙种,一切都忍了。因为,花椒的香味似乎并不适合出现在菜肴之外的地方。有一年,我去甘肃南部的白龙江流域调查兰科植物的分布,恰逢当地花椒丰收。在一个月的时间里,只要进了公交车的门,浓郁的花椒味就会扑面而来。那是一股浓烈,有冲击力,却又似香非香的气味。每每这时,我就会想到,那些住在椒房殿里的皇后们得有多大的忍耐力呢。
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  不过,我很快发现确实有人喜欢花椒的气味。一日,我们去踏青,儿子兴冲冲地举着一个叶子给我看,“爸爸,这个叶子有橘子味”。可是那分明就是一簇花椒叶。花椒的叶子里面多少带点柑橘味,其实这也不奇怪。因为花椒同柑橘一样,也是芸香科的植物。摘下一片花椒叶,对着光看看,就会发现叶片上有很多半透明的圆点——油点。这是包括柑橘在内的所有芸香科植物的共同的特征。油点里储存了大量的挥发油(柠檬烯,芳樟醇等等),柑橘叶片和花椒叶片的浓烈气味也就由此而来。于是,我们采了很多有“橘子味”的花椒叶,带回家。
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  不过,并不是所有的花椒叶片都是有柑橘味道的,我们平常说的花椒实际上是芸香科花椒属植物的大集合。这里面至少包括了花椒、竹叶花椒、川陕花椒、青花椒和野花椒等5个种。这五个种的气味大不一样。就拿花椒和青花椒来说,花椒中富含柠檬烯和芳樟醇所有更有柑橘的气息,而青花椒中占主导地位的则是爱草脑,所以它们的味道更加清冽,偏向于胡椒。当然,我们关注花椒的更多的是在于它的麻。; w: A0 {- v( g- R* @0 q
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  不一样的青花椒( M  e7 z0 m* `- X3 I! I
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  近来,市面上多了一些青色的花椒,其特有的麻味极具穿透力,不仅与鲈鱼和谐相伴,还与麻辣花生携手共舞,最绝的当属麻辣海瓜子。每个小小的海瓜子中都藏满了青花椒的麻,于是,每次吮吸麻辣海瓜子之后,感受到那种舌尖的震颤,怎一个爽字了得。于是,这些青色的花椒有了特别的名称——麻椒。
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  有消息说,这些青色花椒之所以麻,是因为在它们完全成熟的时候采摘下来了。但是事实并非如此,目前市场上青色花椒有两个主要来源。6 f/ q* e  ]. C" @! ^6 p

$ U& J7 R6 n. v! Z  其一是青花椒种的果实,它们的特点是外表比较光滑,油泡比较少,不像花椒的表面那么粗糙。刚刚成熟时,它们的果实还带有红色,但是经过储藏之后,颜色会变成深绿色或者近似黑色。
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  另一种则是藤椒,这是竹叶花椒的一个变种。这类花椒果实形态与普通花椒近似,它们成熟时的颜色依然是绿色,当采摘储存之后,这些花椒的颜色会渐渐泛黄。通过这样颜色的变化,我们可以分辨出两种不同的青花椒。但是在实际的烹饪过程中,除了川菜师傅,很少有人去区分两者味道的差别,因为它们都有一样的麻。$ v; V8 I# F( \0 g7 y, N& P. T

9 t6 U9 ^% w3 ?  人类能适应花椒的麻味,算得上是一件奇异的事情。因为,这种味道甚至算不上一种基本味,而是一种轻微的痛觉。引发这种痛觉的物质就是,花椒中特别的酰胺类物质——山椒素,其中又以α-山椒素的麻味最强。之所以会给我们带来麻味,是因为山椒素可以与我们舌头上负责感觉的T RPV1受体结合,让舌头感觉到刺麻感。有意思的是,辣椒素在我们舌头上也是通过与T RPV1受体结合,发挥作用的。如此看来,麻辣一家相得益彰倒是有几分道理。
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4 r4 ~# C! P0 m1 _  麻能带来健康吗?( e7 O- s% |4 s- v

( d2 Y, N2 z! u2 n2 _4 H  在养生理念盛行的今天,我们总期望饮食能为我们带来额外的健康加分,于是各种传统饮食被贴上了莫名的保健标签,花椒作为八大调味料之一,自然也不会被放过。遗憾的是,除了刺激我们的舌头,花椒中的成分并没有太多的神奇功效。
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  r* |+ _  N% S  如果非要跟健康扯在一起,那还得说α-山椒素。就目前的结果来看,这种物质对蛔虫有很好的毒杀作用。只是,在卫生条件逐步发达的今天,蛔虫感染率已经越来越低(我儿子吃下驱虫药之后,兴冲冲地在马桶里找虫子,也以失望告终)。这种化学武器还有没有用武之地,都值得考虑了。至少,我们已经用不着嚼着花椒粒驱虫了。
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7 S' {1 J+ G" x# F  另外,有实验说,花椒可以在粮仓中抑制曲霉和青霉的生长,这看起来倒像是个不错的用途。回想起来,母亲确实在米箱里面放过花椒。可如今,这种方法似乎也落伍了,一来商品流通迅速,那种粮食堆满一屋子的阵势已不多见;二是,米粒吸收的花椒味着实会影响米饭的风味,这样的存粮技术不要也罢。
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  不管怎么说,花椒带来的辛香味,确实可以让我们多吃两碗饭,这也算得上花椒的功效一件吧。
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" e$ |. M& d, E( \  牙膏里的花椒! D; l4 Y  C1 v1 e' H, ]% [$ Y8 f6 j
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  虽然,花椒和花椒素在效用比拼中得分甚少,但是,花椒的兄弟——两面针却在此方面表现突出。两面针有个小名叫蔓椒,同花椒一样,也是芸香科花椒属的植物。其特征就是叶片两面的叶脉上都长着尖刺,两面针也因此得名。至于它们的花朵,则一如花椒属的其他同伴那样,微小,低调。
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) A; Q# v1 k  v, n4 r' P3 r  大概在20多年前,靠着同名牙膏,这种植物走进了我们的视野。实际上,在《神农本草经》就记载了两面针的镇痛功效。至于治疗牙痛的记载则最早出现在《岭南采药录》中,“患牙痛,煎水含漱”。
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  通过化学分析,我们已经能比较清晰地认识两面针的有效成分。比如,其中的香叶木苷有抗炎作用,对于牙龈的消肿不无裨益。另外,两面针中的生物碱有镇静作用,对于缓解疼痛也是有益的。但是,这并不意味着,我们可以通过嚼两面针来获得好处,相反,随意吃这种植物会危害我们的健康。
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  两面针中的毒性——氯化两面针碱和氧化两面针碱等生物碱,可导致外周神经系统和中枢神经系统的损害。曾将有,口服两面针汤药导致头昏、眼花、呕吐等中毒症状的报道。当服药量过大时,甚至会损伤呼吸中枢,引发昏迷抽搐。所以,还是放弃上山采药、熬汤进补的想法吧。; b$ `+ @4 h  p2 [0 x

4 j  A; X9 V$ M( P" W% t2 T4 p) w  在川菜盛行的今天,花椒的香味和麻味已经弥散在了神州大地。这大概是当初主持敬神仪式的祭司所不曾想到的。把花椒弄上餐桌,堪称中餐大冒险中最成功的案例之一。虽然,花椒并没有带来特别的营养,但是大家依旧可以沉浸在它的香与麻之中。所谓一方水土养一方人,大概就是这个道理。
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. Y, A1 P% @' _1 y+ d  h- s1 i  小贴士
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  如何识别劣质麻椒?
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7 F4 C* x: W) _; y0 q  第一招,水泡,正常花椒浸出的水是浅褐色的,染色花椒的水是红的;第二招,手捏,优质花椒易碎,但是劣质花椒很强韧;第三招,嘴尝,优质花椒的麻味很浓,但是劣质花椒的味道很淡。+ b( t8 _6 i4 N0 B( K5 v  b
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  花椒也是现磨的好( ^- v% r# O4 l4 F. r2 H

# J4 G  \! C% l. h5 n. _% K4 ?  因为花椒中酰胺会逐渐降解,所以它们的味道会越来越淡。磨成面的花椒中,酰胺降解尤其明显。所以,购买花椒面时不要贪多。如果有条件的话,现磨现用是最好的。/ B8 n6 N* |1 M( Y
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  手植记+ W9 s5 J5 q0 t  u# z: L

* Q" d! H+ M# Y6 G  我们快乐&精神食粮
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8 \  e" c5 U  C) P  为生活寻找原生态食材

AN INTRODUCTION TO
+ s% `3 ^+ ~, z4 L$ u: T) bPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
$ A# I) m' @, W  Qby
" ~+ ?9 O" M) H' Q% wA.R.M.MURRAY, M.A., PH.D.; o# V0 W, D& v. D) J- n
Extension Lecturer in Social Philosophy
: a' C9 \8 q5 Din the University of London
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, J* e% x. @* ACONTENTS
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PREFACE vi
. @7 Z$ e( H0 R; j6 H% ^I THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1
  i5 [  g" P' qII THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE SOPHISTS 17
* X0 V+ X# [* t& v$ z! uIII PLATO'S THEORY OF THE IDEAL STATE 24  p1 W+ r4 |. W8 t( o
IV ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF THE BEST POSSIBLE STATE 37+ H& H1 t' ~+ i2 {
V POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN ARISTOTLE AND/ ~9 V- l# [8 W! B! M$ _
MACHIAVELLI 47
: q5 a5 S) s2 f9 ^7 H: lVI MACHIAVELLI ON THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT 54
0 `) d9 J$ O9 h9 }+ @) yVII HOBBES'S THEORY OF THE RATIONAL STATE 61# R* v$ O7 K* C$ v% e) v: w- Y
VIII LOCKE'S THEORY OF THE MORAL STATE 73
5 |( g* k9 {6 N2 `- wIX ROUSSEAU'S THEORY OF THE GENERAL WILL 82" \6 h0 w' K- g4 I+ d
X HUME AND BURKE ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF
6 ^( z0 q* L8 A& lCONSERVATISM 92) g6 [/ s0 @6 U. j* n+ h
XI HEGEL'S IDEALIST THEORY OF THE STATE 100
: Y$ z0 h9 p9 G) \. P. uXII THE UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF BENTHAM AND MILL 109
3 u" _7 K1 c- `: o/ iXIII MARXISM, COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM 123
1 e1 o. X6 a! ^6 E6 b. A' }3 @  I4 hXIV POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 1401 ?& N; V& j) ~, O( _
XV THE JUSTIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT 151
: [0 r9 d6 m/ C( ?INDEX 161( T' x1 {6 R1 B7 H, K* C* O  F

& H. ]& R, Y7 v% b4 LCHAPTER I' i* X( j9 A2 q* `9 {- J
The Nature and Scope of Political Philosophy. e$ P/ q4 g9 I
Until the beginning of the present century philosophy was generally regarded as a source& J0 q, {: ?- G7 r( D
of knowledge which transcended, both in scope and certainty, the discoveries of natural/ l  Z+ @" Y+ U
science. Science, it was agreed, marked an advance on the uncritical and often unrelated! P+ E7 [' U7 j  @( a4 j
beliefs of ordinary life, yet it was itself based on the observations of the senses and consisted
9 e3 o/ ?8 c# {! N/ Q9 ^of the uncertain generalizations based upon them; whereas philosophy was assumed
  L4 v# s* f1 Z  Uto answer questions about such subjects as the existence of God, the nature of knowledge,
2 d5 C. R; T: R& p5 i4 {" zand the authority of the moral law upon which sense-experience, from its very nature, could) ~5 x( O- u6 }( g
throw no light. On such subjects, it was believed, reason was alone competent to pronounce2 B, Y3 J/ A1 C; u  l
and, when it did so, its conclusions were characterized by a logical and universal certainty
% \/ C$ v- c1 D! g) Q  Gwhich the generalizations of natural science could never claim.5 k& |- h5 y1 K0 s) `
That philosophical knowledge is certain and indubitable is a claim which, in a broad4 l9 y% O  O! f, y5 p9 @9 Q* [9 I4 Q5 A
sense, all philosophers have made, or at least implied; and if a short and simple definition
3 E% Y& @. t6 `3 I, Wof philosophy were sought the title of the late Professor Dewey 冯 GirTord Lectures—The
, a1 G7 J; B, H! R* u1 SQuest for Certainty'—might serve as a starting point at least For all philosophers have/ J$ o" _! o0 g5 q/ L/ ^
claimed, or at least implied, that philosophical knowledge not only is, but must be, true.8 k  H% ]& l; }6 G2 o4 j  D
But this general agreement has not prevented fundamental differences of opinion regarding( t6 r2 y; z6 p
the nature and scope of such knowledge; and since these differences are reflected in the
; F* |1 z9 g$ n4 a  I9 Yapplication of philosophy to the problems of political theory it is important to be aware,
. }% @# {, ?" u' Whowever generally, of their nature.
: k+ \$ X  l0 Y- h$ _" m8 iThe different conceptions of philosophy ultimately depend upon different conceptions  G+ m" W- i1 P$ ]
of the nature of indubitable knowledge. The propositions of mathematics are usually cited
! q& j, n- O; B  J6 o! xas typical illustrations of such knowledge. For example, the proposition "Two plus two+ X1 Z% r9 k9 q
equals four1 is said to be necessarily and universally true on the ground that, once we have
& b4 Z  P) W, D* Z2 O* Bgrasped its meaning, we recognize that it must be necessarily and universally true, and9 Q& U/ w0 b' m9 x1 k
because further instances of its truth do not increase our certainty that it must always be2 F1 L! |; j/ z! L: q* J4 z
true. Its falsity, in other words, is inconceivable. On the other hand, there are numerous! o$ v0 D# p7 t
propositions of which the falsity is perfectly conceivable. It may be true that The cat is+ P/ ]% ?6 N7 q! {! X2 @2 k
blackL or that "Poliomyelitis is caused by a vims', but these propositions are not necessarily& C* f. I$ w- v1 ^
true. On the contrary, their falsity is perfectly conceivable, even if observation appears to, Z& g4 g8 O* W* ]
confirm their truth.1 a9 U8 a6 b: W/ n( d( ]: A
Analytic and Synthetic Propositions' p! l( D. `, R, t, G
The distinction just illustrated is variously referred to as the distinction between rational
8 r% N, P" Q7 T. l1 X3 b- f  o1 Eand empirical knowledge, or between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, or between
& x" w" L& u$ Q. o( C, Itruths of reason and truths of fact And it is generally true to say that all philosophers have
2 a! D+ l0 I- q$ O; r+ R4 ^claimed, or at least implied, that their theories are rational and a priori. Where they have4 {8 h" H5 |  h
differed is in their view of the scope of such knowledge. And the main difference has been, m" [" I9 S- O1 L. o0 z
that some have held that rational knowledge is always analytic, while others have held that
# D# j: I  T+ ^, p1 l. a3 Q) W. tit is sometimes synthetic.
% t, t' t$ M8 O% a  A  u) n( m: `7 m9 ^# ^7 Y% q5 h
The difference between analytic and synthetic propositions was defined by the German
- P7 s8 e) o! B5 E4 Dphilosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) as follows: Analytic propositions, he said, 'add" {; u: s1 }. d8 m3 ^+ P$ S9 l- Q8 }
nothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely break it up into those
) S, ^6 l) B8 W! ^" cconstituent concepts that have all along been thought in it, although confusedly', while synthetic
! a0 E4 q6 p0 E7 H4 N( gjudgments 'add to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any  C9 R& b& n' B8 `% y, |
wise thought in it, and which no analysis could possibly extract from it'.1 The difference is,
5 F$ A# S4 n+ }" D  Iin short, that the predicate in an analytic proposition is contained within the meaning of the
2 E$ R8 L4 n4 h7 o0 G7 asubject, while in a synthetic proposition the predicate is not contained within the meaning( S/ M! W; b1 g( U
of the subject but adds something related to it. Kant illustrated the difference by the two
$ Z: S7 M- h( N1 Z9 h/ g6 Qpropositions 'All bodies are extended' and 'All bodies are heavy'. The former, he thought,+ V+ w/ x6 l, B3 ]2 b, p
is analytic, because the concept of 'extension' is part of the meaning of 'body', while the% P. I' j; F( E  k
latter is synthetic because the concept of 'heaviness' is not part of the meaning of 'body',2 J" E" q% Q0 `1 y
but only a quality which it acquires when it is placed in a gravitational field.9 n7 X% L: v6 S1 G
Kant's definition drew attention to an important difference between analytic and synthetic) c+ C- t- j6 ^3 w6 W
propositions, although not all analytic propositions naturally fall into the simple subject-3 f6 X& a' V+ @& |
predicate form which his examples illustrate. The essential characteristic of an analytic
6 H: T6 Q# A" R, ^; q; b8 E8 c' oproposition is that it defines the meaning, or part of the meaning, of its subject and does! P8 K" N  a, Y' Z, S1 T# B9 h2 `
not describe unessential features which may, or may not, belong to it A cube of iron has a
& V+ |6 b( l6 B0 `certain weight at sea level, a smaller weight at the top of a high mountain, and no weight at
1 G$ w) z! z5 s% K+ H# M9 Dall at a certain point between the earth and the moon; but these differences are not essential
8 ?+ a6 D; H7 ?) I; I3 kelements in the meaning of the description 'cube of iron'. It is clear, on the other hand,0 _" n3 M. m0 f1 ]4 O
that if the cube of iron had no extension it would not be a cube of iron, since extension is
) P& S( ?, ]) k( O/ C/ van essential part of the meaning of the phrase 'cube of iron'. In other words, to deny an
+ ?/ i2 V, u: K  G  p. ~; `6 o" H2 Tanalytic proposition is self-contradictory since that is simultaneously asserting and denying% |$ f! K3 a3 W; L% t% J- J
the same thing. It is, to borrow Bertrand Russell's example, like saying 'A bald man is
5 O/ c# N/ Q2 B' {  E0 W. vnot bald'.1
" b# e4 n& C3 z" G' nModern philosophers have devoted much attention to the study of analytic propositions,3 }& j0 e! e; z( @5 R3 e& x" e
and many would agree with Professor Ayer that 'a proposition is analytic when its validity
3 T$ c+ \$ k6 Z/ r5 Xdepends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains',2 and that this is so because
" D4 j. k. T0 S$ i# b9 E" panalytic propositions 'do not make any assertion about the empirical world They simply* o% U4 I+ c3 e
record our determination to use words in a certain fashion.'3 They are, in other words, tautologies;6 F) A) \$ E4 X" x
and the reason why we think it worth while to assert them and sometimes, as in
5 M& M) h) m* ~  u8 H+ Smathematics, to draw elaborate deductions from them, is that our reason is too limited to1 c1 [+ [3 [' I7 q
recognize their full significance without going through these complex verbal processes.6 N. M' v) X- v+ K# d
These considerations may appear to be extremely abstract and their connection with
1 c6 i8 I3 _) N4 j0 [% s3 Rwhat is commonly understood as 'political philosophy' far from obvious; but in fact this6 g) B1 L* O0 u$ |
connection is both simple and fundamental. For philosophy is the 'quest for certainty', and* y/ J# O3 C* o2 P& t, J
if certainty is a characteristic of propositions, then an inquiry into the nature and scope of
0 a4 |1 \: J4 \& [6 L3 G5 \1 Critique of Pure Reason, Second Edition, Introduction.
5 O# I: G9 S, ?& t1 The Problems of Philosophy, p. 129.: r1 f& ?! I  a. U9 U
2 Language, Truth, and Logic, Second Edition, p. 78.6 [( C, E; Q3 t2 \: }5 o
J op. cit, p. 84.
" R( ]+ @+ @7 M! U) E& S' f7 e" b4 [/ u: u9 L, V
certain, i.e. a priori, propositions must be the essential task of all philosophy. If, in other
7 j) B  D. a6 u& G; L: W, Pwords, the general object of philosophy is to discover the nature and implications of rational7 L5 T4 U9 O' h) I# V: L
thinking, then an enquiry into the nature of the propositions by which rational thinking+ c+ |% Q% U7 \% k
is expressed is necessarily one of the most important tasks of philosophy so understood
7 ]1 }7 m; T! m; ~' p$ r, QAll philosophers who have recognized the distinction between analytic and synthetic
6 i6 q2 ?# p5 W9 q  [propositions have agreed that analytic propositions are necessary and a priori. Controversy1 L! ^% N  @" J' p7 H$ w  `& P
has centred on the question whether synthetic propositions may also sometimes be a priori.
& [$ @- m; F1 `5 X. F6 V6 [And the different answers given to this question have determined very different conceptions
( e& G4 V5 j# k& M9 T" _of the scope and purpose of philosophy. For if the propositions of philosophy must
! {: U  V5 ~; ~& n5 h$ L9 t; `always be a priori, and a priori propositions must always be analytic, it follows that the8 n6 |4 N$ J, X
propositions of philosophy must always be analytic.
# \9 h; v% d$ x$ GNow one important class of proposition which is never analytic is the class of existential
; ^; T: S6 |# [propositions, i.e. propositions asserting something of the real world. While it is necessarily
5 c* N; L8 e  R2 S5 g9 `. htrue that 2 plus 2 equals 4, it is not necessarily true that there are four distinguishable3 ?# ~& b' L6 F# ]  W
objects in the real world. For example, if I have £2 in one pocket and £2 in another, it necessarily
9 A% ?7 S7 {/ y9 afollows that I have £4. in both pockets, but it is for empirical observation to ascertain- s( b3 |0 E' c' z, R
whether in fact I have £2 in one pocket and £2 in another pocket This simple example illustrates
- f) l$ b' H; w- L9 _% Z' Gthe important principle that analytic propositions apply only in a hypothetical sense9 r% c' z# o4 w* F) }* e& ^
to the real world. No analytic proposition of the form XA is BN can be asserted categorically/ v+ _7 J( _* R$ ~4 y8 I& l& l. E2 ?
of the real world. It can only be asserted in the hypothetical form 'If X (some existing3 c! ~) x/ v' h; M. H% {
thing) is A then it must be B.' But the proposition asserting that X is in fact A is synthetic
) y& x$ |: ~' n6 a5 Y7 tand cannot be necessarily true unless synthetic propositions can be a priori+ E- B' q  _. c& v+ H+ q
Thus if a priori propositions are always analytic, philosophy will be unable to demonstrate4 v, b3 \  D+ R) ]/ T
the truth of any proposition about the existing world except in so far as it is logically
0 ^  A# B& `7 j4 W$ C$ E$ qimplied by an existential proposition whose truth has been established (if it can be established)
( G$ u/ I* E/ S% l* Z( T' Cby empirical observation. The function of philosophy, in other words, will be to
+ S: T$ D" }; }( @& ]; S3 {examine the implications of propositions and not to demonstrate their truth.
: ^: t3 B. V$ F/ Z4 hAs already mentioned, however, it was widely believed until some fifty years ago that% S3 ?$ y) r, V) l) |( b
philosophy could establish facts about the existing world quite independently of experience.
8 t, B5 {- i) F, \; U+ I2 J; PPhilosophy was, indeed, often looked to for a rational justification of beliefs, such* G/ k6 _5 M) V+ E7 D" X
as religious or moral beliefs, already held on non-rational grounds, and it was assumed
; S2 Q5 `/ J3 h+ x6 Y5 athat this justification could be given independently of experience. But during the present
0 d( t( b- _8 kcentury there has been a strong reaction from these methods and a growing acceptance of
3 }$ |% `4 `1 ^5 p5 R% Cthe alternative view that the function of philosophy is to clarify rather than to extend the
: I* R& E# t$ ?# i6 Econtent of human knowledge." C( x  ~% I4 d: ]8 [
The theory that a priori thinking can never by itself establish a truth about the existing
7 Z4 T) F( y: b  f- {world is known as Empiricism, since it always asserts that such propositions can be# j6 {3 Z* Y0 b6 f9 k$ o
established only by empirical observation. The alternative theory that a priori thinking can
/ {. O- ^( {1 b. E. A7 L1 I& _& Yby itself establish truths about the existing world is known as Rationalism. And it is clear
+ d8 }+ n& r3 Jfrom the preceding discussion that Rationalism can be defended only if synthetic a priori
4 B( V7 H) j- }$ {  Y  n  npropositions are possible. For if such propositions are not possible no proposition about the
# z, {" o- H, h# g% ~' b/ ~0 Yexisting world can be established a priori, and some form of Empiricism must therefore( U, l4 l* [2 l. S, `, ~
be accepted
5 o. L# ~$ j  j, l( M7 B; j
2 L) j7 W+ w+ ^& R; ]Before the present century, when the doctrine has received wide support, the most celebrated: V2 |" O/ R6 `$ A
exponent of Empiricism was the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776),. |/ p+ W. S: `! z6 g' ?
now generally recognized to have been one of the greatest philosophers of all time. Hume5 |; Y9 K* k5 o/ @( R$ s
held that the only propositions which are certainly true are those which describe A relations. t7 u% N1 E* q
of ideas', by which he meant analytic relationships in the sense defined above. Those
) _# \- p% Z( k! Y4 c( X" Mwhich describe "matters of factQ, i.e. synthetic propositions, cannot be rationally justified,# m1 s: K7 j! _
although they can be accepted as true in so far as they are justified by direct observation.
# D# W! }( Q. d* |$ S& s2 UBut of course the great majority of synthetic propositions—in particular, the socalled' U8 ], S  m4 G! B) U
'laws' of science—go far beyond this and make assertions which cannot be justified by
6 A; E; M5 |9 Dexperience.9 s. s/ @5 K4 d( C0 {4 b9 R
Thus Hume argued that the belief in the universal truth of scientific laws follows
5 Y9 o9 b7 a' arepeated observations of the sequences which they describe; but he denied that there is any) ~/ z# V/ z- w9 K- o
necessity in these sequences, or even in the occurrence of the belief that they are universal
- N. _: a* N7 O# p9 U3 land necessary. If I infer that, because all observed samples of arsenic have proved to be4 }' \9 u: X9 ?0 _. w2 \+ U* b
poisonous, therefore all samples whatsoever are poisonous, no logical justification of this' M1 q4 d% ^/ C$ g* |
inference can, according to Hume, be given. It is just a fact that, following on the observation. T4 e0 X* J/ Q; I
of numerous samples of arsenic which prove to be poisonous, everybody believes1 X! Z1 u  K& |& E" S
that all samples whatsoever will prove to be poisonous. But there is, according to Hume,& Y) Q2 v& `. L! r/ ~4 q& L5 f
no rational justification for this belief; it just happens to occur following on experience of
" O; O  I& I7 ~! Y# w4 v. Hthe effects of arsenic in a limited number of instances, and just happens to have proved a
8 a2 `8 F% q) lreliable guide in practice. There is no guarantee that it will prove to be true of all instances
# ~! _3 o/ ]( Z, `* twhatsoever. Thus there is nothing A reasonable' in the belief in the a priori sense.' f7 A3 k( M2 {2 t& ?
Hume reached the same sceptical conclusions about the general propositions of morality.
+ a3 K6 v. P: ]; MHe thought it obvious that these propositions are synthetic, and argued that they cannot
0 o* C/ K  |0 v; Qtherefore be a priori Such propositions as C Jealousy is evilA or F Lying is wrongJ are," I3 |4 r- F# E  S
he thought, obviously synthetic in that their predicates are not part of the meaning of the/ h% `4 F$ q0 n6 Z  z
subjects. And such propositions cannot be a priori, for no necessary connection can, in his
. ^6 ]7 B: Y' Y; L* cview, be discerned between the subject and the predicate. Hence the basis for these moral* h1 d* ?$ Q$ o8 N
generalizations must be the same as the basis for the generalizations of natural science—
* H/ v. ?* m* i2 sthe observation of a limited number of instances. And this is not a rational ground for& k0 J3 Y7 C5 X: W# C! a
asserting them.
/ x6 ~) T- P# j# W, EHaving denied that moral generalizations have any logical necessity, Hume set himself
" @2 z4 I( C- }+ S, g, y: Kto analyse the empirical evidence on which they are based. He reached the conclusion that
+ i  [& t3 s: A; T% h$ ethe basis of such generalizations is a peculiar type of sentiment or feeling. When I say
9 e9 B# ~. N7 O1 z! Z"Honesty is goodN I am, according to Hume, saying, in a rather specific sense of the word
* O" O$ _! j' _: L+ V( q% M* O1 X, F) |'likeY, i Like honestyP. I am, in fact, describing not an inherent quality of honesty but a feeling
0 N+ y! v  v/ d' `# E( \excited in me by the contemplation of honesty. This feeling Hume called the 'pleasing
4 d' u0 _1 n5 h; m* P3 Q' Nsentiment of approbationU. He thought that moral disapproval in the same way expresses a
! V, `( _! j: L' E) o9 xsentiment of disapprobation. Thus Hume concluded that there is nothing "rationalE or "logicalH- Z2 U' Z+ s3 L, {1 c- r+ t3 X3 u  y9 j
in morality and that it is impossible to show, on a priori grounds, that moral propositions
4 ]3 X1 C  ~6 r4 x4 q0 w) U# {- n5 tare true or false. Their truth or falsity depends on the purely empirical question! r* e2 e2 ]/ w9 t4 O
whether they are or are not accurate descriptions of the feelings to which they relate.  s% z/ T5 w5 `' j; _% k( h
utsa|rka;;23kD6+5LVp03HLC5via=| 1283980562) {8 J: L9 P9 c) {
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