返回列表 发帖

手植记丨花椒:中国味的脊梁

AN INTRODUCTION TO" [( ~4 b: Y- B. q8 V
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY1 w- V; M8 g3 v' n3 l
by
! E( k1 o. n" g6 @A.R.M.MURRAY, M.A., PH.D.
8 k3 p6 c2 _  @4 F) K' qExtension Lecturer in Social Philosophy
5 _# q  ]" l+ p: T, {in the University of London
* d( f/ A# S: J  h
" E5 M- _4 m# a) w6 jCONTENTS
. Z+ `/ E+ w; O/ d. aPAGE, u) v; v; Y" t  R: k; |
PREFACE vi
+ N9 U& i" K) N' G3 ]; uI THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1% f/ @) P$ s. P' R3 |
II THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE SOPHISTS 17
+ n; Z( c. |7 a) K* ZIII PLATO'S THEORY OF THE IDEAL STATE 24* H& f# F- ~1 U, c) d, D; u
IV ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF THE BEST POSSIBLE STATE 37( v" T: y$ ^  @* P3 n+ }& ~
V POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN ARISTOTLE AND& [3 L7 Z5 c* Z5 @) S9 Q9 s
MACHIAVELLI 47
) X# X8 W0 z: t6 ?# K2 IVI MACHIAVELLI ON THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT 54
$ R, V: l% k  u- E% Z2 oVII HOBBES'S THEORY OF THE RATIONAL STATE 61
9 a0 X7 y' {  k8 X8 v1 l- [VIII LOCKE'S THEORY OF THE MORAL STATE 73# n" w, i; l/ y) h4 Q/ A9 L
IX ROUSSEAU'S THEORY OF THE GENERAL WILL 82
3 B6 @  t4 |6 ~+ T; u: q% bX HUME AND BURKE ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF, a$ ?$ m. U. n# i0 l0 t
CONSERVATISM 92
# J. W5 p6 G4 ~5 l: t' P" `XI HEGEL'S IDEALIST THEORY OF THE STATE 100
1 u: F+ F8 [4 s: ~6 [XII THE UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF BENTHAM AND MILL 109- n% D9 F& T+ z4 `# k
XIII MARXISM, COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM 123. _* i, N& A9 n7 K
XIV POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 140
1 K) E0 f( Y# I( o' v0 CXV THE JUSTIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT 151
. y+ g8 ]% [  e0 F5 h! a" X1 tINDEX 161
2 C0 Z5 q6 l# n6 x
& H! q5 w" [1 N+ _/ O$ E4 x/ j3 MCHAPTER I
" ~2 g: H! m2 K$ [6 w0 r: x7 hThe Nature and Scope of Political Philosophy& `4 T* `' w2 m0 r" ~8 a
Until the beginning of the present century philosophy was generally regarded as a source
8 `6 E0 U# s: G! a& t* F" Rof knowledge which transcended, both in scope and certainty, the discoveries of natural, g+ a; l3 V/ J# F
science. Science, it was agreed, marked an advance on the uncritical and often unrelated) Z! t7 I. `- W* r' B- \6 `! C! H6 M
beliefs of ordinary life, yet it was itself based on the observations of the senses and consisted
" w$ u  k9 B- c$ Aof the uncertain generalizations based upon them; whereas philosophy was assumed
1 o6 ^$ h1 d- i, M1 vto answer questions about such subjects as the existence of God, the nature of knowledge,
- E: e  o+ Q; Mand the authority of the moral law upon which sense-experience, from its very nature, could' l0 j! l  R. g1 l! F
throw no light. On such subjects, it was believed, reason was alone competent to pronounce
" p" J: k0 Q3 eand, when it did so, its conclusions were characterized by a logical and universal certainty) R- e) J+ i! \- ]9 v) l) B
which the generalizations of natural science could never claim.) {# Q" V4 D+ b; u0 ?
That philosophical knowledge is certain and indubitable is a claim which, in a broad" j& K6 V- t  e8 p( d  J
sense, all philosophers have made, or at least implied; and if a short and simple definition
; P; T: b5 i) L0 C  A+ tof philosophy were sought the title of the late Professor Dewey 冯 GirTord Lectures—The7 c; N' @7 E# J; V& V: R
Quest for Certainty'—might serve as a starting point at least For all philosophers have( t: H% W+ r( c% i+ p
claimed, or at least implied, that philosophical knowledge not only is, but must be, true.$ m# U6 ]  A* d, S( m
But this general agreement has not prevented fundamental differences of opinion regarding
/ O, C8 ?0 u  D5 D# J( Vthe nature and scope of such knowledge; and since these differences are reflected in the
7 ?* J* M- x3 ?% G) P! \application of philosophy to the problems of political theory it is important to be aware,
# [/ |/ J7 H$ \& r" Whowever generally, of their nature./ _' p) w& a5 R8 T8 E- _1 v- r
The different conceptions of philosophy ultimately depend upon different conceptions
  Z' ~9 V0 }  ~$ S& p+ Hof the nature of indubitable knowledge. The propositions of mathematics are usually cited
" g) [  a/ r( }& S5 b$ k7 N9 @as typical illustrations of such knowledge. For example, the proposition "Two plus two- T" [5 H' D- K) V3 m/ z% L
equals four1 is said to be necessarily and universally true on the ground that, once we have) }; u) Q  i! T& l& I
grasped its meaning, we recognize that it must be necessarily and universally true, and! z( R! Z8 s6 C3 y; @$ q
because further instances of its truth do not increase our certainty that it must always be2 V  G9 E) z1 E6 E
true. Its falsity, in other words, is inconceivable. On the other hand, there are numerous
  D: i! ~7 _  m+ {propositions of which the falsity is perfectly conceivable. It may be true that The cat is
, \6 M8 f$ z' J1 k- |% W  LblackL or that "Poliomyelitis is caused by a vims', but these propositions are not necessarily
2 ]+ h  U& H5 I+ G% v  Y/ Strue. On the contrary, their falsity is perfectly conceivable, even if observation appears to
2 X( J7 f% W- r! econfirm their truth.. p; `" a  i0 Y& }' v. [3 @4 L. a
Analytic and Synthetic Propositions5 T) h. R$ w" ~5 K/ m3 k* [
The distinction just illustrated is variously referred to as the distinction between rational
! }/ M# {1 p4 K; s& ?3 \2 z6 |and empirical knowledge, or between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, or between) U  J. x; g% t! b, Q! g
truths of reason and truths of fact And it is generally true to say that all philosophers have1 Y- z3 I- n6 q
claimed, or at least implied, that their theories are rational and a priori. Where they have
0 G) P3 y( a2 K7 @5 b$ B5 Bdiffered is in their view of the scope of such knowledge. And the main difference has been
4 ]% ~9 U1 v5 q, N" zthat some have held that rational knowledge is always analytic, while others have held that  b+ x0 J  Z+ S: m( c; F" |  S
it is sometimes synthetic." T4 c6 B9 V( }1 a, `

: f3 F/ b; B! LThe difference between analytic and synthetic propositions was defined by the German2 M6 u; y' t6 O  _4 D1 t8 C
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) as follows: Analytic propositions, he said, 'add
) l" M& C; C  i; M4 Q# snothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely break it up into those
$ ]3 E! _0 n: zconstituent concepts that have all along been thought in it, although confusedly', while synthetic* k# o) p. ?0 T$ V3 T0 I! p
judgments 'add to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any
. ^& v4 l; S5 M( Xwise thought in it, and which no analysis could possibly extract from it'.1 The difference is,
" ]/ B( l' s% R% h; h5 @6 l0 Gin short, that the predicate in an analytic proposition is contained within the meaning of the
7 Y+ q7 R3 X1 [4 isubject, while in a synthetic proposition the predicate is not contained within the meaning0 v7 b5 c' H6 p8 I) e
of the subject but adds something related to it. Kant illustrated the difference by the two5 r* O7 e+ T8 _4 _# D
propositions 'All bodies are extended' and 'All bodies are heavy'. The former, he thought,  R- ~; h1 Y! _( @7 R6 {
is analytic, because the concept of 'extension' is part of the meaning of 'body', while the+ ?: M& l; h, V5 m
latter is synthetic because the concept of 'heaviness' is not part of the meaning of 'body',
: X: ]' e% I& Gbut only a quality which it acquires when it is placed in a gravitational field.) m5 |2 K. D5 f/ n5 }
Kant's definition drew attention to an important difference between analytic and synthetic8 K0 S4 B1 N9 B, {( ?2 u
propositions, although not all analytic propositions naturally fall into the simple subject-
! P1 j0 {; u" `predicate form which his examples illustrate. The essential characteristic of an analytic
4 x/ v7 J  T1 j/ y& l9 q! tproposition is that it defines the meaning, or part of the meaning, of its subject and does
2 `) n. A0 D3 n+ P9 snot describe unessential features which may, or may not, belong to it A cube of iron has a
4 K2 R) N+ E; w* k/ dcertain weight at sea level, a smaller weight at the top of a high mountain, and no weight at
$ p) i& A9 }) G# v! g/ b4 G7 iall at a certain point between the earth and the moon; but these differences are not essential
9 ?& v  X4 K. @, q+ Z( e7 f  q: o( zelements in the meaning of the description 'cube of iron'. It is clear, on the other hand,
/ c! \, i6 S* N1 Lthat if the cube of iron had no extension it would not be a cube of iron, since extension is
8 F6 l! q2 h4 y; Han essential part of the meaning of the phrase 'cube of iron'. In other words, to deny an
% j9 N2 m4 `( U4 V' C$ Lanalytic proposition is self-contradictory since that is simultaneously asserting and denying
/ s  H' F- g% {' l! g  F- U: Bthe same thing. It is, to borrow Bertrand Russell's example, like saying 'A bald man is
! ]5 n! y3 ~/ Hnot bald'.1
! |& {0 U  ^* P4 S# I/ h/ Q: K6 bModern philosophers have devoted much attention to the study of analytic propositions,
4 a, h; t+ K5 j! e; V) Rand many would agree with Professor Ayer that 'a proposition is analytic when its validity9 K" L7 a7 u4 p$ u0 A% z
depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains',2 and that this is so because
0 v- y3 K' ^; U0 M& p$ sanalytic propositions 'do not make any assertion about the empirical world They simply, y2 L5 p. n8 J
record our determination to use words in a certain fashion.'3 They are, in other words, tautologies;0 e% O7 T0 O& V6 ~; O# B. i
and the reason why we think it worth while to assert them and sometimes, as in0 J' p4 G0 v$ ?/ c5 V0 }; N
mathematics, to draw elaborate deductions from them, is that our reason is too limited to
% Y/ ]: E1 h8 m7 R) b1 |recognize their full significance without going through these complex verbal processes.
( Y( ]7 j) e! E$ e, }3 b5 D' S' {These considerations may appear to be extremely abstract and their connection with' l/ b2 T6 ]3 |, V7 R
what is commonly understood as 'political philosophy' far from obvious; but in fact this
& g$ i" ^- A( Y' g: V+ @+ }connection is both simple and fundamental. For philosophy is the 'quest for certainty', and
) ]3 F6 A- f) V, G3 Y7 Kif certainty is a characteristic of propositions, then an inquiry into the nature and scope of3 Y0 ?1 s% v* E% C/ X
1 Critique of Pure Reason, Second Edition, Introduction.8 c5 P4 X6 b% I! m: L. [
1 The Problems of Philosophy, p. 129.
$ U* l# t: g, P- w9 ]" p, A0 f2 Language, Truth, and Logic, Second Edition, p. 78.+ J2 {; S" k" w% w9 W* b
J op. cit, p. 84.0 R. d8 l/ h1 Q( J3 s  h* f

- |0 _" H: M9 W! ]certain, i.e. a priori, propositions must be the essential task of all philosophy. If, in other
$ F4 x* b% m0 [words, the general object of philosophy is to discover the nature and implications of rational, L- q8 _# b- Z8 s
thinking, then an enquiry into the nature of the propositions by which rational thinking" j& Z( D* o5 q/ W5 Y
is expressed is necessarily one of the most important tasks of philosophy so understood% S7 G+ a+ V. [4 k! j# {; O9 b) G
All philosophers who have recognized the distinction between analytic and synthetic
+ T/ \) r5 H3 J' Wpropositions have agreed that analytic propositions are necessary and a priori. Controversy
: y( \5 r- [( \# A2 Jhas centred on the question whether synthetic propositions may also sometimes be a priori.
7 }+ X5 U) l" Z6 y; [" D) t& A7 bAnd the different answers given to this question have determined very different conceptions
/ o' ~5 b# o& ~of the scope and purpose of philosophy. For if the propositions of philosophy must8 s! L) J; [) {  Z/ H$ E! n5 F
always be a priori, and a priori propositions must always be analytic, it follows that the
6 {6 e) |) c2 spropositions of philosophy must always be analytic.
7 W8 G! _7 h- H& ^; MNow one important class of proposition which is never analytic is the class of existential2 U% l' n, }* i2 l
propositions, i.e. propositions asserting something of the real world. While it is necessarily0 a+ \# O4 i% X0 H# E) n% z' {
true that 2 plus 2 equals 4, it is not necessarily true that there are four distinguishable- q8 ~7 y& C4 Q, ?8 Z) ^
objects in the real world. For example, if I have £2 in one pocket and £2 in another, it necessarily$ t, n6 P. P! K* G3 p; i
follows that I have £4. in both pockets, but it is for empirical observation to ascertain
7 p8 V3 r+ L. E, `' i, jwhether in fact I have £2 in one pocket and £2 in another pocket This simple example illustrates
- ?. Y" I7 c! t# N5 }6 gthe important principle that analytic propositions apply only in a hypothetical sense
( g$ ^2 F3 e- L5 U9 U1 Z- Vto the real world. No analytic proposition of the form XA is BN can be asserted categorically' w8 g. P9 U! ?( F/ O& [. k3 ]
of the real world. It can only be asserted in the hypothetical form 'If X (some existing; B0 j# C& G, [
thing) is A then it must be B.' But the proposition asserting that X is in fact A is synthetic) e( L- I# {, U$ \# K' \& G- Y4 [
and cannot be necessarily true unless synthetic propositions can be a priori. c6 Q# h: Y6 B+ c4 J8 z5 f
Thus if a priori propositions are always analytic, philosophy will be unable to demonstrate
4 W, r  W; r6 |# h; r0 F2 Jthe truth of any proposition about the existing world except in so far as it is logically' \( G- H5 I" s  ~6 q; v2 a$ Q! e
implied by an existential proposition whose truth has been established (if it can be established)4 F- j7 M% T( w
by empirical observation. The function of philosophy, in other words, will be to
; g% p+ f5 G* }: Z6 R! r/ m) W; b7 mexamine the implications of propositions and not to demonstrate their truth.: S# H0 f, h1 H
As already mentioned, however, it was widely believed until some fifty years ago that- w, m6 {1 l9 d4 h9 I
philosophy could establish facts about the existing world quite independently of experience.
' {- M* J# T! V; q6 @$ ^Philosophy was, indeed, often looked to for a rational justification of beliefs, such
$ A6 x' \5 u8 {# has religious or moral beliefs, already held on non-rational grounds, and it was assumed
1 ]3 \& @1 w% v0 ^4 B8 L/ Ithat this justification could be given independently of experience. But during the present# ]4 T2 A$ {0 U0 N4 d5 d
century there has been a strong reaction from these methods and a growing acceptance of& {& h4 b5 {6 Y, `2 {( U
the alternative view that the function of philosophy is to clarify rather than to extend the
% o  x9 R5 V( Y) B1 Ocontent of human knowledge.& v( U2 i% v  A) K! j' t: s" v
The theory that a priori thinking can never by itself establish a truth about the existing4 M. j8 L. Y3 O2 h+ a+ G
world is known as Empiricism, since it always asserts that such propositions can be9 _, Q% `4 [. B& X
established only by empirical observation. The alternative theory that a priori thinking can+ j7 t) x; A8 ^
by itself establish truths about the existing world is known as Rationalism. And it is clear' @1 U. R) m0 s7 }: _% S6 B
from the preceding discussion that Rationalism can be defended only if synthetic a priori
* A# p8 m" ~/ j8 ]; g) Spropositions are possible. For if such propositions are not possible no proposition about the; X9 g  P) I& S" I. r! J
existing world can be established a priori, and some form of Empiricism must therefore# C" W, n, W  ^9 c" k( J
be accepted/ S: \# X5 G3 s0 x
6 V! n& F+ _( O' U) I
Before the present century, when the doctrine has received wide support, the most celebrated% r! z+ _: t, X# W' L
exponent of Empiricism was the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776),
, e8 ?" n% Y% `, ?2 c8 E) tnow generally recognized to have been one of the greatest philosophers of all time. Hume% U9 v1 O: ^7 @
held that the only propositions which are certainly true are those which describe A relations- ^  O7 W& k; H# z2 J" J9 U- d
of ideas', by which he meant analytic relationships in the sense defined above. Those0 a. ?- g/ Y2 g& h/ D1 h2 ]: q
which describe "matters of factQ, i.e. synthetic propositions, cannot be rationally justified,
) ^( ~* J: E) _* R: H' s' Q  `# lalthough they can be accepted as true in so far as they are justified by direct observation.6 ^1 W: ^3 U3 @0 a. k
But of course the great majority of synthetic propositions—in particular, the socalled
# t- n+ B, o+ y  W'laws' of science—go far beyond this and make assertions which cannot be justified by
7 Y0 L1 [( Q. w% \$ I9 j! [experience.
# v' P7 b: k$ m( D8 M  j4 PThus Hume argued that the belief in the universal truth of scientific laws follows5 e! y' K2 ]* x! l* o( `& ]* K* q/ t
repeated observations of the sequences which they describe; but he denied that there is any+ b( m# d3 w0 m  `
necessity in these sequences, or even in the occurrence of the belief that they are universal4 V/ D) J$ d# h4 H$ }) Q$ S
and necessary. If I infer that, because all observed samples of arsenic have proved to be+ s5 M. d7 H- a- b  {1 n4 [# ]; \: g6 z
poisonous, therefore all samples whatsoever are poisonous, no logical justification of this" M) V2 f# M7 p) }& m& V/ m" |
inference can, according to Hume, be given. It is just a fact that, following on the observation
6 e4 X: N* v' o. t/ kof numerous samples of arsenic which prove to be poisonous, everybody believes0 h$ l* u# p5 n: d7 D2 K" {
that all samples whatsoever will prove to be poisonous. But there is, according to Hume,
- A  y* @9 N7 ^( E/ B% sno rational justification for this belief; it just happens to occur following on experience of6 a" ^+ h7 Q; A* J; E; \7 r, g
the effects of arsenic in a limited number of instances, and just happens to have proved a
$ [: C: [  ~8 L% y" J2 b" ]reliable guide in practice. There is no guarantee that it will prove to be true of all instances1 T+ `* c* O+ J, Z$ k4 i6 }& x
whatsoever. Thus there is nothing A reasonable' in the belief in the a priori sense.
! Z0 K: @0 O. hHume reached the same sceptical conclusions about the general propositions of morality.
- I/ X- _* ]& Z0 Y( \% MHe thought it obvious that these propositions are synthetic, and argued that they cannot- b5 z2 ^8 F! x
therefore be a priori Such propositions as C Jealousy is evilA or F Lying is wrongJ are,6 F$ x: a1 o: C- P  W7 L
he thought, obviously synthetic in that their predicates are not part of the meaning of the
. _" G+ L& ?0 {subjects. And such propositions cannot be a priori, for no necessary connection can, in his
3 F" x% q6 J3 [+ x+ Kview, be discerned between the subject and the predicate. Hence the basis for these moral: c! D* W- I, {* [
generalizations must be the same as the basis for the generalizations of natural science—
! m" o: I$ o  ithe observation of a limited number of instances. And this is not a rational ground for
' C0 `8 f2 {8 l8 j- z% Casserting them.7 W# M7 H& d, [$ y7 w( R3 U
Having denied that moral generalizations have any logical necessity, Hume set himself
8 T( G2 ?' k, O( kto analyse the empirical evidence on which they are based. He reached the conclusion that
; Q& v* w1 V2 g; |/ Z# othe basis of such generalizations is a peculiar type of sentiment or feeling. When I say
5 i3 e6 j& ?5 U8 _) m"Honesty is goodN I am, according to Hume, saying, in a rather specific sense of the word' t" I9 I8 X, d  }% x5 W( J
'likeY, i Like honestyP. I am, in fact, describing not an inherent quality of honesty but a feeling  D0 n8 \% N  [5 _4 a
excited in me by the contemplation of honesty. This feeling Hume called the 'pleasing  _' J8 x3 x5 S1 F' k! }
sentiment of approbationU. He thought that moral disapproval in the same way expresses a& k' Q4 l% I5 S. ~! d$ X! {
sentiment of disapprobation. Thus Hume concluded that there is nothing "rationalE or "logicalH5 @- X. w+ m" y
in morality and that it is impossible to show, on a priori grounds, that moral propositions
: s. K9 ]9 {2 z$ l8 h, n9 Gare true or false. Their truth or falsity depends on the purely empirical question
: U8 @3 i3 U+ G% Ywhether they are or are not accurate descriptions of the feelings to which they relate.% s6 S. G+ Z/ Z4 e7 r# i* D- Q
utsa|rka;;23kD6+5LVp03HLC5via=| 1283980562) D( l1 S5 ~' K* t1 j- {& }) c& d" x6 Q

# W' l1 l7 c. w! O% X% f敬聪
0 L& o7 a+ l6 \% a7 ^1 A+ f0 {6 |+ b* M2 ?5 i8 G4 e, T
; Y2 \& M& y3 j% n
1 n$ J. H6 J2 p1 Z

% y# j/ M. X9 O' G2 B9 C. a' G6 ^+ a+ [9 k# Z! u+ k0 L
联系QQ:526781618! j& Q: X4 x! p& v! W" t

+ \1 H& L  c1 q9 Y3 b( p4 z) f/ J1 P淘宝旺旺:跟朝流走% J6 u2 y) |" `% F# B% E
( ^( P4 A9 N/ P! p* C! p
有需要的欢迎联系!专业代购电子书
8 O' S2 R3 k/ h; U6 d
9 G1 c( ~% ^; A- P* P5 r" b' i

' q; r* b. T5 |% V6 b  u, `1 L$ p9 s. J( ^6 n: I
ebook 英文电子书代购

TOP

返回列表