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手植记丨花椒:中国味的脊梁

AN INTRODUCTION TO: M! w; G' r% K  o1 f0 u, Q
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY2 t2 d8 L: A* z
by
5 b6 I) l* Z  z' PA.R.M.MURRAY, M.A., PH.D.( M# q( X1 `/ y' _+ R3 n5 ?+ F
Extension Lecturer in Social Philosophy
& |0 d, \! W$ R5 @/ X5 rin the University of London
9 U" n  A. N9 s* F) L( e7 N
% `' d. N' r' R+ u; qCONTENTS
5 \% y; i9 S5 A' J' _PAGE! `3 O# f# J. z6 v' J: |8 a
PREFACE vi
1 k' B. t# K6 w) P8 PI THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1
0 |4 D7 }7 E- I9 F/ S9 SII THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE SOPHISTS 17
- F: m/ I+ t. W. Z; Z+ C4 Q& Q) B5 wIII PLATO'S THEORY OF THE IDEAL STATE 24
+ n+ ^4 s3 G# F9 D& sIV ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF THE BEST POSSIBLE STATE 37
, t$ ~6 s: a- f% g! M2 QV POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN ARISTOTLE AND
: T9 {5 ?5 f. l; X! e$ D4 U% bMACHIAVELLI 47. d2 A! A( e6 W' A- r  d
VI MACHIAVELLI ON THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT 54
: w: a; p* h' a# J: fVII HOBBES'S THEORY OF THE RATIONAL STATE 619 c4 Z3 V4 u/ Q& |# w
VIII LOCKE'S THEORY OF THE MORAL STATE 738 x1 D! Z8 e) j5 h3 M1 |2 d
IX ROUSSEAU'S THEORY OF THE GENERAL WILL 82
2 |, t4 Z4 h: L' b2 h- `  o5 CX HUME AND BURKE ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF
7 Y' `/ M( ~0 L! l& a, aCONSERVATISM 92
" Y" z& a5 [( i' B: K: PXI HEGEL'S IDEALIST THEORY OF THE STATE 100
; A6 ^/ a- D0 h' _3 s* iXII THE UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF BENTHAM AND MILL 1097 k/ z( [1 ]' s4 `
XIII MARXISM, COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM 123/ ?& R$ p6 b/ ~4 m
XIV POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 140
7 U, M3 S( U& TXV THE JUSTIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT 151- m1 ?2 v0 a8 G4 f2 ?
INDEX 161% a& j9 J2 N+ e/ N

: X2 T9 M+ Y. ~# PCHAPTER I
. P& p/ R5 }- m" R; D. ^The Nature and Scope of Political Philosophy% J* c/ t/ |) s, ]( [/ d' {8 p1 m
Until the beginning of the present century philosophy was generally regarded as a source
& C; w  W) u0 O( a, [$ b" Aof knowledge which transcended, both in scope and certainty, the discoveries of natural( D0 X9 W2 O+ w5 z/ T5 V
science. Science, it was agreed, marked an advance on the uncritical and often unrelated
" E7 f! Y  C8 Nbeliefs of ordinary life, yet it was itself based on the observations of the senses and consisted$ ~: p7 @6 _0 k/ U; i: D
of the uncertain generalizations based upon them; whereas philosophy was assumed
/ P7 K  J, f0 F# E+ h, kto answer questions about such subjects as the existence of God, the nature of knowledge,* \6 B. e9 g  K% n/ \6 V
and the authority of the moral law upon which sense-experience, from its very nature, could' s- I8 O5 F; F$ k/ J
throw no light. On such subjects, it was believed, reason was alone competent to pronounce
7 L/ S/ a# [- ]& E0 E/ }" Yand, when it did so, its conclusions were characterized by a logical and universal certainty
, t1 k  V1 ?! I( K+ z( pwhich the generalizations of natural science could never claim.  W# S9 j6 ~+ ?; e6 O2 ?
That philosophical knowledge is certain and indubitable is a claim which, in a broad
( P" \3 A/ A7 l+ }1 g* R) ssense, all philosophers have made, or at least implied; and if a short and simple definition
' `  P9 F+ w( _3 z0 p' Q2 Bof philosophy were sought the title of the late Professor Dewey 冯 GirTord Lectures—The
3 o7 {, g' w7 y. P9 q5 U+ J1 E2 X" CQuest for Certainty'—might serve as a starting point at least For all philosophers have* h* ~3 L, R- j
claimed, or at least implied, that philosophical knowledge not only is, but must be, true.5 c$ @# j# _1 Y, _9 S
But this general agreement has not prevented fundamental differences of opinion regarding7 x5 ^$ V: k, E$ m
the nature and scope of such knowledge; and since these differences are reflected in the
- ?3 i% ~+ V3 z4 ~# r* Kapplication of philosophy to the problems of political theory it is important to be aware,( o# t' s; K  d- H# [2 E4 g
however generally, of their nature.
! u9 U9 U- z; N& J) `The different conceptions of philosophy ultimately depend upon different conceptions; A' f8 P/ a% m+ Q6 E
of the nature of indubitable knowledge. The propositions of mathematics are usually cited; }/ t9 `! e2 O( o- M
as typical illustrations of such knowledge. For example, the proposition "Two plus two6 I6 w- q5 p  C  S: ?/ q
equals four1 is said to be necessarily and universally true on the ground that, once we have  a3 l2 I. n2 _9 u+ w% P& H
grasped its meaning, we recognize that it must be necessarily and universally true, and& a" g* C" u% m. v5 ^
because further instances of its truth do not increase our certainty that it must always be
/ d. N" @+ F/ M4 |: K8 T/ ctrue. Its falsity, in other words, is inconceivable. On the other hand, there are numerous
5 T8 w( H; z& F- j/ tpropositions of which the falsity is perfectly conceivable. It may be true that The cat is* D# M! z0 V1 O2 t3 C
blackL or that "Poliomyelitis is caused by a vims', but these propositions are not necessarily- `4 `8 D0 k+ m' p( v  V: c7 p3 p
true. On the contrary, their falsity is perfectly conceivable, even if observation appears to
. d7 U  {, c- ^confirm their truth.0 O. \/ z; ~6 i* v
Analytic and Synthetic Propositions/ _9 W. N, o5 c! V) r1 ~5 H2 D
The distinction just illustrated is variously referred to as the distinction between rational
: v2 ?  f. O1 W9 z  band empirical knowledge, or between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, or between
3 w1 y; V& q1 U1 U/ y' S/ P4 ptruths of reason and truths of fact And it is generally true to say that all philosophers have
7 v3 x: ~4 y+ R7 Kclaimed, or at least implied, that their theories are rational and a priori. Where they have
1 |! ?: F0 x; O/ D: _' R9 |9 z* [differed is in their view of the scope of such knowledge. And the main difference has been, L% |+ V/ D% ~% S* T
that some have held that rational knowledge is always analytic, while others have held that7 k# N$ k* q! D
it is sometimes synthetic.  Y7 T: c% y- u# c
4 u% ?! ^" u6 X+ V' v3 a: i
The difference between analytic and synthetic propositions was defined by the German" u3 {* Z, K0 Y
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) as follows: Analytic propositions, he said, 'add
1 G0 o( F! `' S( Q6 d! @nothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely break it up into those
" `4 j3 I  l$ s1 F9 b8 fconstituent concepts that have all along been thought in it, although confusedly', while synthetic
/ _- _# j( h  x) l+ Bjudgments 'add to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any
- ^/ B  _. ]. Wwise thought in it, and which no analysis could possibly extract from it'.1 The difference is,4 S# i6 E) d) j0 S
in short, that the predicate in an analytic proposition is contained within the meaning of the7 F2 R9 H( F0 e, R; J- ]
subject, while in a synthetic proposition the predicate is not contained within the meaning  y+ e; \6 K& v3 d' c
of the subject but adds something related to it. Kant illustrated the difference by the two5 n0 R9 \) O! H. p$ i
propositions 'All bodies are extended' and 'All bodies are heavy'. The former, he thought,9 m+ T2 k* B( u
is analytic, because the concept of 'extension' is part of the meaning of 'body', while the
: t1 Q8 F" @" x& r, ?latter is synthetic because the concept of 'heaviness' is not part of the meaning of 'body',
7 \0 r0 _* ~7 T7 }, @but only a quality which it acquires when it is placed in a gravitational field./ @- y6 }) [2 q$ p( r( {
Kant's definition drew attention to an important difference between analytic and synthetic# |; `6 q& T; B  T
propositions, although not all analytic propositions naturally fall into the simple subject-
$ |4 l- e$ r5 D, W% S1 |, Wpredicate form which his examples illustrate. The essential characteristic of an analytic. A' B# u. p6 O" @
proposition is that it defines the meaning, or part of the meaning, of its subject and does
# s) |5 E7 B6 S' v) xnot describe unessential features which may, or may not, belong to it A cube of iron has a2 j) _: T7 |# A
certain weight at sea level, a smaller weight at the top of a high mountain, and no weight at
+ |7 w& y" {+ ^! U0 |3 \all at a certain point between the earth and the moon; but these differences are not essential( H8 @+ |0 l7 D4 K0 }
elements in the meaning of the description 'cube of iron'. It is clear, on the other hand,0 r' A& @" P& x1 W$ \, z- f! M
that if the cube of iron had no extension it would not be a cube of iron, since extension is8 S' _6 f2 Y+ G4 |( Q& ~7 [
an essential part of the meaning of the phrase 'cube of iron'. In other words, to deny an
6 c8 {4 K; p0 Janalytic proposition is self-contradictory since that is simultaneously asserting and denying* z- x( O% A+ \; a6 [/ E
the same thing. It is, to borrow Bertrand Russell's example, like saying 'A bald man is1 W5 q1 ^2 \. t' |  L; W- n9 w7 t3 k7 c
not bald'.1
  Z3 S- a+ c' n2 N! B% VModern philosophers have devoted much attention to the study of analytic propositions,
, e5 P8 r9 Q. Gand many would agree with Professor Ayer that 'a proposition is analytic when its validity2 H8 I5 n9 I% g- c
depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains',2 and that this is so because* i4 I* U" o4 _  o; b1 c
analytic propositions 'do not make any assertion about the empirical world They simply8 L) A; G- Q! f/ Z9 d; U, r& q" f
record our determination to use words in a certain fashion.'3 They are, in other words, tautologies;
/ Q- x& q/ g8 p! jand the reason why we think it worth while to assert them and sometimes, as in
$ J# V% e4 g/ R: W) m5 o2 U$ \1 r- Kmathematics, to draw elaborate deductions from them, is that our reason is too limited to
) G3 u7 G# z8 c7 W0 j( h) [+ m6 Srecognize their full significance without going through these complex verbal processes.+ f& V# c5 W' M0 P7 l5 X. K
These considerations may appear to be extremely abstract and their connection with
! X; A* G! n) B, u, h) G7 q3 |what is commonly understood as 'political philosophy' far from obvious; but in fact this
- Y$ a3 C" D' @/ H: r% |connection is both simple and fundamental. For philosophy is the 'quest for certainty', and# N0 H& S# ~$ ?% n
if certainty is a characteristic of propositions, then an inquiry into the nature and scope of
. V0 g3 `: Z5 h1 Critique of Pure Reason, Second Edition, Introduction.. z+ T( ^0 i% Z: i
1 The Problems of Philosophy, p. 129.
0 m7 t* Y8 L( f+ e" O7 l7 b& W4 s2 Language, Truth, and Logic, Second Edition, p. 78.6 d, Z4 O* L& a6 \5 W
J op. cit, p. 84." ~" G+ Q7 n3 c

) H9 T  r! ^. |9 ?% _certain, i.e. a priori, propositions must be the essential task of all philosophy. If, in other
- B: x+ v* G* mwords, the general object of philosophy is to discover the nature and implications of rational
; R9 u: u+ A" O! m" a  P" uthinking, then an enquiry into the nature of the propositions by which rational thinking' C. I# H0 j& ^
is expressed is necessarily one of the most important tasks of philosophy so understood) {1 O1 {( l9 N2 g( x1 j
All philosophers who have recognized the distinction between analytic and synthetic
, D* T5 V3 M, ~propositions have agreed that analytic propositions are necessary and a priori. Controversy$ l) h3 h( l9 J$ \
has centred on the question whether synthetic propositions may also sometimes be a priori.
3 o! a2 ?, `8 yAnd the different answers given to this question have determined very different conceptions/ C- ~2 T0 b/ U2 t, v- w0 p- A2 H* w
of the scope and purpose of philosophy. For if the propositions of philosophy must. n1 Q$ K+ f) t' ~: _4 E& ^" {- t) m# v8 X
always be a priori, and a priori propositions must always be analytic, it follows that the0 g" t5 _7 R; h) T
propositions of philosophy must always be analytic.0 M' p0 Q: s1 S; X* v
Now one important class of proposition which is never analytic is the class of existential/ K8 ]( i3 ^+ A0 r4 n
propositions, i.e. propositions asserting something of the real world. While it is necessarily
* A' Y! S) s! F4 Y9 v  c2 @true that 2 plus 2 equals 4, it is not necessarily true that there are four distinguishable* ]0 }* I! _+ _9 C2 L
objects in the real world. For example, if I have £2 in one pocket and £2 in another, it necessarily2 ?% J1 I5 V3 e! G
follows that I have £4. in both pockets, but it is for empirical observation to ascertain' q# [  t- ?. `  ]# ]3 |  y, s
whether in fact I have £2 in one pocket and £2 in another pocket This simple example illustrates
5 T  S- r  c9 j  Ithe important principle that analytic propositions apply only in a hypothetical sense% ~. O; T. d2 t
to the real world. No analytic proposition of the form XA is BN can be asserted categorically
6 X' R" S6 b" \7 Vof the real world. It can only be asserted in the hypothetical form 'If X (some existing! f/ L. S; h  V, |: }
thing) is A then it must be B.' But the proposition asserting that X is in fact A is synthetic
% d  v( S9 \5 `9 O3 ~, _and cannot be necessarily true unless synthetic propositions can be a priori
% c; D: @& ]; EThus if a priori propositions are always analytic, philosophy will be unable to demonstrate
# m8 X$ _4 q5 h; `% K6 n% e. }9 _the truth of any proposition about the existing world except in so far as it is logically
0 e/ O5 L7 t+ w% R! cimplied by an existential proposition whose truth has been established (if it can be established)
) E" R1 z0 G: S3 w0 cby empirical observation. The function of philosophy, in other words, will be to1 h+ p' D' N2 W6 Y2 u
examine the implications of propositions and not to demonstrate their truth.
" \1 X! Y2 P" d8 X# |, NAs already mentioned, however, it was widely believed until some fifty years ago that
8 @* w2 v; t+ @" sphilosophy could establish facts about the existing world quite independently of experience.
, A" T/ r7 M6 wPhilosophy was, indeed, often looked to for a rational justification of beliefs, such/ p0 X# P* X4 t
as religious or moral beliefs, already held on non-rational grounds, and it was assumed
  I, ~  F' m8 {  ^that this justification could be given independently of experience. But during the present
. H9 Y& a* _( b% R+ Ocentury there has been a strong reaction from these methods and a growing acceptance of; [) J/ `3 e7 T, M; I2 P2 x1 d
the alternative view that the function of philosophy is to clarify rather than to extend the
+ j# r) q9 z. ^2 i& m# Z2 w1 Xcontent of human knowledge.
, k, p8 M' s* [; KThe theory that a priori thinking can never by itself establish a truth about the existing
9 ~2 ^9 p. {2 B+ H, i& dworld is known as Empiricism, since it always asserts that such propositions can be. R1 Q" M: F# p0 y( n7 L5 d& z
established only by empirical observation. The alternative theory that a priori thinking can
3 Z8 O: V$ G- ?by itself establish truths about the existing world is known as Rationalism. And it is clear
! ~6 K% d: ~2 Q& O' dfrom the preceding discussion that Rationalism can be defended only if synthetic a priori
/ i/ P; N) F( {3 {- w$ `propositions are possible. For if such propositions are not possible no proposition about the- X1 Y2 D; ~% I: j8 U4 j! p
existing world can be established a priori, and some form of Empiricism must therefore+ @8 o0 Y; y, f; ^* G7 V
be accepted6 I9 J7 o8 K  C, {# o3 q5 G

+ z- \) s- b2 ]3 aBefore the present century, when the doctrine has received wide support, the most celebrated
; I$ w! ^0 I# v6 F8 T, w2 Rexponent of Empiricism was the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776),
3 g$ Q) ^. B7 ~! Cnow generally recognized to have been one of the greatest philosophers of all time. Hume* \( P5 \% [3 n# m
held that the only propositions which are certainly true are those which describe A relations
% i- s: [3 z* J; Qof ideas', by which he meant analytic relationships in the sense defined above. Those
1 K# c* v1 J; J7 zwhich describe "matters of factQ, i.e. synthetic propositions, cannot be rationally justified,3 ^- ]& ~* l8 Z# M" p  a. {& s( O
although they can be accepted as true in so far as they are justified by direct observation.) ^" @5 h6 |; K4 ~
But of course the great majority of synthetic propositions—in particular, the socalled, k0 \# c/ A# ^8 ?3 C2 a
'laws' of science—go far beyond this and make assertions which cannot be justified by3 J( T3 z* `/ w5 @1 Z) L  ^
experience.
8 U* S' t- l/ l4 S, @' Q! VThus Hume argued that the belief in the universal truth of scientific laws follows8 p6 c0 G: H- [$ a
repeated observations of the sequences which they describe; but he denied that there is any
" [  B% }5 E/ r; e  Hnecessity in these sequences, or even in the occurrence of the belief that they are universal
" k- ^2 V7 w( ~5 r' D8 N3 L, cand necessary. If I infer that, because all observed samples of arsenic have proved to be  Y! `- I; ]7 Q, e3 C4 e( u3 \
poisonous, therefore all samples whatsoever are poisonous, no logical justification of this
4 ~4 Y( A+ K) P+ b) G+ D, d0 v# ninference can, according to Hume, be given. It is just a fact that, following on the observation+ l. O+ I! _* X1 _
of numerous samples of arsenic which prove to be poisonous, everybody believes/ S/ D* W# `, V0 \4 N0 {  b1 \
that all samples whatsoever will prove to be poisonous. But there is, according to Hume," r; L' F2 L6 A& R  {  Z0 ]
no rational justification for this belief; it just happens to occur following on experience of0 v6 y% B: V7 C. F5 g9 i
the effects of arsenic in a limited number of instances, and just happens to have proved a
7 D# }5 n/ b6 E6 C) u( W2 wreliable guide in practice. There is no guarantee that it will prove to be true of all instances# s9 v6 \2 O% Q' j# P
whatsoever. Thus there is nothing A reasonable' in the belief in the a priori sense.4 W6 c, H) G" K3 m3 I* b) R0 e4 d
Hume reached the same sceptical conclusions about the general propositions of morality.
1 \# Q& S1 y( [. I! \/ b% ^4 C% h7 IHe thought it obvious that these propositions are synthetic, and argued that they cannot2 D2 X* J8 m* O6 |6 Y
therefore be a priori Such propositions as C Jealousy is evilA or F Lying is wrongJ are,
% w+ _# [- m1 w8 T- {& whe thought, obviously synthetic in that their predicates are not part of the meaning of the
3 h# G* M. O, b) {* Vsubjects. And such propositions cannot be a priori, for no necessary connection can, in his1 m- H4 o( _1 V( x4 V* M: C# }
view, be discerned between the subject and the predicate. Hence the basis for these moral+ O$ F( K/ @0 R& X$ r
generalizations must be the same as the basis for the generalizations of natural science—
4 ^5 _' h9 t- T' `: r8 C1 [the observation of a limited number of instances. And this is not a rational ground for2 i3 ~9 a5 L3 \( e1 @/ J
asserting them.: r1 d0 }; {" X  ]  D$ B0 c; x
Having denied that moral generalizations have any logical necessity, Hume set himself
7 G! W: k0 }9 Z  i; G0 g: S% Fto analyse the empirical evidence on which they are based. He reached the conclusion that% A6 i0 O! ?2 o0 n% V
the basis of such generalizations is a peculiar type of sentiment or feeling. When I say
  F: J. ^" r7 b"Honesty is goodN I am, according to Hume, saying, in a rather specific sense of the word
! F9 v4 `: j5 F'likeY, i Like honestyP. I am, in fact, describing not an inherent quality of honesty but a feeling
9 W8 _7 d# }* Z" Fexcited in me by the contemplation of honesty. This feeling Hume called the 'pleasing
! b9 M9 J4 ^7 r9 d! {sentiment of approbationU. He thought that moral disapproval in the same way expresses a# S6 n# y7 c/ s1 I1 n
sentiment of disapprobation. Thus Hume concluded that there is nothing "rationalE or "logicalH/ l3 ^8 p- _* A" _# Q' N
in morality and that it is impossible to show, on a priori grounds, that moral propositions
2 l( N! V* v& {1 Q* S% jare true or false. Their truth or falsity depends on the purely empirical question
. |9 p" d9 h) S! S1 Kwhether they are or are not accurate descriptions of the feelings to which they relate.
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