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手植记:旅行找食材,原生本初心

手植记:旅行找食材,原生本初心

 

手植记:旅行找食材,原生本初心

2015年央视“3.15晚会”刚刚结束,今年的主题是“消费在阳光下”,小编特别留意了一下,今年的晚会在食品安全方面并没有过多阐述,其中一个亮点性的内容是在食品安全召回方面有了制度上的规范。当然我们不希望等到食品召回时才发现有安全问题,那早已晚了,于是如何吃得好,吃得安全就成了亟需解决的问题。

事情发生问题,我们的第一反应就是寻找原因,因为寻找根源才是问题解决之本,作为生活在钢筋混凝土包围的都市人群,每天高楼大厦、工业污染、尾气排放,处处都充满着危机感。在都市中生活的越久,人们越觉得植物自然生长带来的魅力,对原生食材的关注和诉求也越来越多。

谈“吃”色变是现代人对都市生活方式的真实写照,这个想吃,怕抹激素,那个也想尝尝,怕添加防腐剂,想起那捧起一捧溪水就能张口大喝的日子,一阵唏嘘,这也不过是十几年的时间,我们的世界已经被各种污染、添加剂所侵蚀,想寻点原生态的食材也成为一种奢侈。越难寻找就越有人参与到其中,体验与大自然亲密接触。从央视的《舌尖上的中国》到《走遍中国》,再到互联网年轻群体的小圈层活动,越来越多的团队参与到寻找原生食材的行列之中。

  “手植之旅”的诞生便成为一种必然。“手植之旅”是由原生农产品电商品牌手植记组织发起的在全国探寻原生食材的一个寻访活动,目前已开展两季(第一季,为生活探寻原生食材,主要是山东丘陵地区,第二季,专注于食物与生活的品质,主要是山西太行山脉地区。)手植记最早这个想法来自于某创意公司CEO的一个小私心,他觉得原生食材确实是难得的好东西,就想着找来给员工发福利,改善一下员工的生活品质,却意外发现人们对原生食材需求很大,便想着干脆把它做成一个品牌吧。没想到竟迅速赢得大众的认可,也积累了不少忠实的顾客。

一个招募生活理念相同的人参与其中,一起寻访手植系食材,共同追求积极的生活精神和生活品质的想法便逐渐成型。说起“手植之旅”的初衷,用他们自己的话就是:“不道听途说,寻找真正的原生食材,送给自己和家人,算是在奔向大叔/大妈的旅途中,做出的一点点改变”。

手植记的一系列活动也为那些平时没时间打理自己生活,加班熬夜且满脸痘痘还依然热爱生活,积极向上的都市人,在繁杂的生活中增添点阳光之色。

  手植记
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手植记
我们快乐&精神食粮
为生活寻找原生态食材

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手植记
我们快乐&精神食粮
为生活寻找原生态食材
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Contents
Preface page xi
1 Introduction 1
Empirical psychology and philosophical analysis 2
Metaphysics and the philosophy of mind 3
A brief guide to the rest of this book 6
2 Minds, bodies and people 8
Cartesian dualism 9
The conceivability argument 11
The divisibility argument 13
Non-Cartesian dualism 15
Are persons simple substances? 18
Conceptual objections to dualistic interaction 21
Empirical objections to dualistic interaction 24
The causal closure argument 26
Objections to the causal closure argument 29
Other arguments for and against physicalism 32
Conclusions 36
3 Mental states 39
Propositional attitude states 40
Behaviourism and its problems 41
Functionalism 44
Functionalism and psychophysical identity theories 48
The problem of consciousness 51
Qualia and the inverted spectrum argument 53
Some possible responses to the inverted spectrum argument 55
The absent qualia argument and two notions of consciousness 59
Eliminative materialism and ‘folk psychology’ 61
Some responses to eliminative materialism 64
Conclusions 66
vii
viii Contents
4 Mental content 69
Propositions 70
The causal relevance of content 74
The individuation of content 79
Externalism in the philosophy of mind 82
Broad versus narrow content 84
Content, representation and causality 89
Misrepresentation and normality 92
The teleological approach to representation 95
Objections to a teleological account of mental content 99
Conclusions 100
5 Sensation and appearance 102
Appearance and reality 103
Sense-datum theories and the argument from illusion 107
Other arguments for sense-data 110
Objections to sense-datum theories 112
The adverbial theory of sensation 114
The adverbial theory and sense-data 116
Primary and secondary qualities 119
Sense-datum theories and the primary/secondary distinction 121
An adverbial version of the primary/secondary distinction 125
Do colour-properties really exist? 126
Conclusions 128
6 Perception 130
Perceptual experience and perceptual content 131
Perceptual content, appearance and qualia 135
Perception and causation 137
Objections to causal theories of perception 143
The disjunctive theory of perception 145
The computational and ecological approaches to perception 149
Consciousness, experience and ‘blindsight’ 155
Conclusions 158
7 Thought and language 160
Modes of mental representation 162
The ‘language of thought’ hypothesis 164
Analogue versus digital representation 167
Imagination and mental imagery 169
Thought and communication 175
Do animals think? 178
Natural language and conceptual schemes 183
Contents ix
Knowledge of language: innate or acquired? 188
Conclusions 191
8 Human rationality and artificial intelligence 193
Rationality and reasoning 194
The Wason selection task 196
The base rate fallacy 200
Mental logic versus mental models 203
Two kinds of rationality 208
Artificial intelligence and the Turing test 209
Searle’s ‘Chinese room’ thought-experiment 214
The Frame Problem 218
Connectionism and the mind 221
Conclusions 227
9 Action, intention and will 230
Agents, actions and events 231
Intentionality 235
The individuation of actions 240
Intentionality again 243
Trying and willing 246
Volitionism versus its rivals 250
Freedom of the will 252
Motives, reasons and causes 257
Conclusions 262
10 Personal identity and self-knowledge 264
The first person 266
Persons and criteria of identity 270
Personal memory 277
Memory and causation 282
Animalism 283
Knowing one’s own mind 288
Moore’s paradox and the nature of conscious belief 291
Externalism and self-knowledge 293
Self-deception 296
Conclusions 297
Bibliography 298
Index 313

Preface
At a time when many introductory books on the philosophy
of mind are available, it would be fair to ask me why I have
written another one. I have at least two answers to this question.
One is that some of the more recent introductions to
this subject have been rather narrow in their focus, tending
to concentrate upon the many different ‘isms’ that have
emerged of late – reductionism, functionalism, eliminativism,
instrumentalism, non-reductive physicalism and so
forth, all of them divisible into further sub-varieties. Another
is that I am disturbed by the growing tendency to present
the subject in a quasi-scientific way, as though the only
proper role for philosophers of mind is to act as junior partners
within the wider community of ‘cognitive scientists’. It
may be true that philosophers of an earlier generation were
unduly dismissive – and, indeed, ignorant – of empirical psychology
and neuroscience, but now there is a danger that the
pendulum has swung too far in the opposite direction.
Perhaps it will be thought that my two answers are in conflict
with one another, inasmuch as the current obsession
with the different ‘isms’ does at least appear to indicate an
interest in the metaphysics of mind, a distinctly philosophical
enterprise. But there is no real conflict here, because much
of the so-called ‘metaphysics’ in contemporary philosophy of
mind is really rather lightweight, often having only a tenuous
relation to serious foundational work in ontology. In fact,
most of the current ‘isms’ in the philosophy of mind are generated
by the need felt by their advocates to propound and
justify a broadly physicalist account of the mind and its capaxi
xii Preface
cities, on the questionable assumption that this alone can
render talk about the mind scientifically respectable. Many
of the esoteric disputes between philosophers united by this
common assumption have arisen simply because it is very
unclear just what ‘physicalism’ in the philosophy of mind
really entails. In the chapters that follow, I shall try not to
let that relatively sterile issue dominate and distort our philosophical
inquiries.
This book is aimed primarily at readers who have already
benefited from a basic grounding in philosophical argument
and analysis and are beginning to concentrate in more detail
upon specific areas of philosophy, in this case the philosophy
of mind. The coverage of the subject is broad but at the same
time, I hope, sharply focused and systematic. A start is made
with a look at some fundamental metaphysical problems of
mind and body, with arguments for and against dualism providing
the focus of attention. Then some general theories of
the nature of mental states are explained and criticised, the
emphasis here being upon the strengths and weaknesses of
functionalist approaches. Next we turn to problems concerning
the ‘content’ of intentional states of mind, such as
the question of whether content can be assigned to mental
states independently of the wider physical environments of
the subjects whose states they are. In the remaining chapters
of the book, attention is focused successively upon more specific
aspects of mind and personality: sensation, perception,
thought and language, reasoning and intelligence, action and
intention, and finally personal identity and self-knowledge.
The order in which these topics are covered has been deliberately
chosen so as to enable the reader to build upon the
understanding gained from earlier chapters in getting to
grips with the topics of later chapters. Rather than include
separate guides to further reading for the topics covered by
the book, I have avoided unnecessary duplication by constructing
the notes for each chapter in such a way that they
serve this purpose as well as providing references.
The book is not partisan, in the sense of espousing an
exclusive approach to questions about the mind in general –
Preface xiii
such as any particular form of physicalism or dualism – but
at the same time it does not remain blandly neutral on more
specific issues. Developments in empirical psychology are
taken into account, but are not allowed to overshadow genuinely
philosophical problems. Indeed, my approach is a problem-
oriented one, raising questions and possible answers,
rather than aiming to be purely instructive. I have

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