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AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY A R M MURRAY ebook 电子书代购

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY A R M MURRAY ebook 电子书代购

AN INTRODUCTION TO
) ]! Z" @% j# K% i6 b7 ~8 E& O# OPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
; |3 T  @! H' @4 P7 @4 R. o' q& y4 \by
  L% ?0 b7 U# o4 C: dA.R.M.MURRAY, M.A., PH.D.
8 i5 S. t/ U$ Z7 Z9 e" mExtension Lecturer in Social Philosophy
) Z! A! C7 r6 e8 _- d: Cin the University of London. ~" A, u9 Y) d* p1 T3 g) w- o6 x
( q" n2 J9 j0 B) ^2 B: y4 [
CONTENTS- R" h7 B7 b+ Q" c. Y
PAGE
1 S, X, e, h" G: R% T6 o7 z4 nPREFACE vi& m! S2 V( [  Y8 V
I THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1
7 y& L4 ]1 S5 O% `6 d- m5 eII THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE SOPHISTS 17! ^+ A  x  a, W+ X$ Z$ z
III PLATO'S THEORY OF THE IDEAL STATE 24
; \4 S+ d) q8 F% x6 w0 w! Q' m" \IV ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF THE BEST POSSIBLE STATE 37# p2 P2 E' ?8 x
V POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN ARISTOTLE AND$ o+ y& Q& U- A6 ?# c2 X* z' V
MACHIAVELLI 47
2 W1 g. w- x# i+ rVI MACHIAVELLI ON THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT 54
- Z( J5 J& ^* tVII HOBBES'S THEORY OF THE RATIONAL STATE 61! V/ w* k# \! s3 v6 p
VIII LOCKE'S THEORY OF THE MORAL STATE 73
  ^" T( X  m0 B) |3 g0 dIX ROUSSEAU'S THEORY OF THE GENERAL WILL 82! q1 e* [1 K) r0 n, Z7 Y( f
X HUME AND BURKE ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF
0 y8 A) z& K* X5 s9 |, U( NCONSERVATISM 92! r8 k5 P. n/ L# A+ r9 |& t
XI HEGEL'S IDEALIST THEORY OF THE STATE 100
/ R6 ]* ^# ^& m% ZXII THE UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF BENTHAM AND MILL 109
- f# M! y) h, R' l- k6 X7 o0 oXIII MARXISM, COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM 123( V/ D# _; _7 W' N) C0 I
XIV POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 1408 A6 r" q5 b$ g- ~4 N: q) R
XV THE JUSTIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT 151& p7 `+ Z$ q4 B' t& \
INDEX 1614 e+ \$ k( A9 \, e( @

$ N' T- ~3 R8 |CHAPTER I
& D* I- p2 J3 z0 i. ]The Nature and Scope of Political Philosophy
5 e% Y4 I$ F4 BUntil the beginning of the present century philosophy was generally regarded as a source
* k- ~. I+ C1 n! a1 w; Q$ Eof knowledge which transcended, both in scope and certainty, the discoveries of natural
% h% M3 y! o# r' zscience. Science, it was agreed, marked an advance on the uncritical and often unrelated
3 Y: m+ l3 _2 ]. k0 R2 q: obeliefs of ordinary life, yet it was itself based on the observations of the senses and consisted
- B% o& [! F) h2 J( H" wof the uncertain generalizations based upon them; whereas philosophy was assumed
+ a! b; A$ I2 e8 @4 X5 F% Cto answer questions about such subjects as the existence of God, the nature of knowledge,9 C" K2 k6 h! D5 I- n; I
and the authority of the moral law upon which sense-experience, from its very nature, could+ i1 t/ M) E- J
throw no light. On such subjects, it was believed, reason was alone competent to pronounce
7 ?1 w; G2 k( p) q2 dand, when it did so, its conclusions were characterized by a logical and universal certainty
( @1 ?0 s8 Y& z4 F( u3 Gwhich the generalizations of natural science could never claim.& c3 x; g4 U2 [0 G7 f; U3 v  J- \
That philosophical knowledge is certain and indubitable is a claim which, in a broad$ V% T" ^5 q1 w+ w  o" f
sense, all philosophers have made, or at least implied; and if a short and simple definition
( t) }0 o- x1 U9 W! j4 b- ?of philosophy were sought the title of the late Professor Dewey 李 GirTord Lectures—The
2 Q5 s* J4 n: i, AQuest for Certainty'—might serve as a starting point at least For all philosophers have
" V8 A5 G$ M  b, bclaimed, or at least implied, that philosophical knowledge not only is, but must be, true.' l2 s: }) n7 ]# t5 |
But this general agreement has not prevented fundamental differences of opinion regarding# U) U4 C' X% I1 D5 T
the nature and scope of such knowledge; and since these differences are reflected in the
  l2 [8 _9 [0 F* qapplication of philosophy to the problems of political theory it is important to be aware,' @7 H" s* M+ n- ~/ R5 O
however generally, of their nature.$ X3 R  l' L/ m: C9 A1 ]- \
The different conceptions of philosophy ultimately depend upon different conceptions( J6 D: k. h# j4 e2 i0 R4 s. D
of the nature of indubitable knowledge. The propositions of mathematics are usually cited
9 }% z, V" Y9 p; P0 b8 has typical illustrations of such knowledge. For example, the proposition "Two plus two
6 W! I/ ?9 w0 K9 [' xequals four1 is said to be necessarily and universally true on the ground that, once we have
* A9 ]: m0 Z0 m( F9 Q% @& tgrasped its meaning, we recognize that it must be necessarily and universally true, and  Y; h# J; J/ g! O6 ~
because further instances of its truth do not increase our certainty that it must always be
9 X6 X: T5 T4 T4 q8 utrue. Its falsity, in other words, is inconceivable. On the other hand, there are numerous) _! t% N$ x- r  `" t  i8 ]
propositions of which the falsity is perfectly conceivable. It may be true that The cat is( Q$ d: @3 `/ c
blackF or that "Poliomyelitis is caused by a vims', but these propositions are not necessarily8 e+ P- J+ E6 ?- E  r9 H
true. On the contrary, their falsity is perfectly conceivable, even if observation appears to
  A! n) l6 N5 g. Y5 u, N& V1 {confirm their truth.
6 Y/ m0 s5 ~# d! K- d, ~8 I* yAnalytic and Synthetic Propositions
1 l  g) J1 x! o' v1 B3 N2 S& ~  cThe distinction just illustrated is variously referred to as the distinction between rational
* {) P) g$ h: ~2 j$ }% ?9 J  _and empirical knowledge, or between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, or between
4 |6 ]: A6 ^- W" Y; \truths of reason and truths of fact And it is generally true to say that all philosophers have3 T  R$ e2 D& W8 v5 w
claimed, or at least implied, that their theories are rational and a priori. Where they have! U! ~/ s, |8 h$ I& S* F
differed is in their view of the scope of such knowledge. And the main difference has been
/ o3 _6 D$ s  wthat some have held that rational knowledge is always analytic, while others have held that
$ N: ], ?7 P$ ^it is sometimes synthetic.
9 ]$ R: K* V: E% [( |# ^
1 m  w2 G; @/ s' ~2 ]The difference between analytic and synthetic propositions was defined by the German
# N6 J* q# e1 o, Z. q/ _5 ephilosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) as follows: Analytic propositions, he said, 'add0 h7 P$ F2 \- J) [2 r& Q
nothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely break it up into those
7 G) ^# U7 v# g) ^! |1 `5 A: ?constituent concepts that have all along been thought in it, although confusedly', while synthetic
/ a% f6 Q: V2 k& u; R/ h0 Ojudgments 'add to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any
& z- a5 f8 {8 J* }: x8 Awise thought in it, and which no analysis could possibly extract from it'.1 The difference is,
% s7 T; E2 b4 Uin short, that the predicate in an analytic proposition is contained within the meaning of the
4 R1 a0 R: R2 ksubject, while in a synthetic proposition the predicate is not contained within the meaning
/ x- I. |( C8 I$ x8 wof the subject but adds something related to it. Kant illustrated the difference by the two* ~! }+ H7 B. H( E) `
propositions 'All bodies are extended' and 'All bodies are heavy'. The former, he thought,
8 V. H1 b( L+ o9 G5 [" A" {is analytic, because the concept of 'extension' is part of the meaning of 'body', while the
' k4 u. E5 K1 g' C2 c7 {latter is synthetic because the concept of 'heaviness' is not part of the meaning of 'body',( G2 H* m. I. @5 ?. ]! ]  x
but only a quality which it acquires when it is placed in a gravitational field.
. U( L  A7 G3 p# Z  p1 G4 ]Kant's definition drew attention to an important difference between analytic and synthetic
4 R5 c6 A, n1 h, }  v) Spropositions, although not all analytic propositions naturally fall into the simple subject-
0 B% K1 [) L: q1 c$ _/ a- X! Qpredicate form which his examples illustrate. The essential characteristic of an analytic# p: t: R+ |, J4 C, u5 x8 [# d" U
proposition is that it defines the meaning, or part of the meaning, of its subject and does
1 j; g. @$ ~3 I+ i8 e( U+ Unot describe unessential features which may, or may not, belong to it A cube of iron has a
6 b2 T' S6 i9 |5 @5 W# v4 \certain weight at sea level, a smaller weight at the top of a high mountain, and no weight at4 @  ?6 U# v+ H3 s" W- C8 Y
all at a certain point between the earth and the moon; but these differences are not essential
! `* }3 @" r* R# selements in the meaning of the description 'cube of iron'. It is clear, on the other hand,+ N. `% T( n4 J
that if the cube of iron had no extension it would not be a cube of iron, since extension is
# \1 Y  f5 r6 ?! d8 p* Ean essential part of the meaning of the phrase 'cube of iron'. In other words, to deny an! h% Q  l- K2 b$ o: C+ n4 `6 k
analytic proposition is self-contradictory since that is simultaneously asserting and denying
% A& O; k9 u% r' Z1 c8 Bthe same thing. It is, to borrow Bertrand Russell's example, like saying 'A bald man is
) c2 g7 T8 j4 A; U: ?0 z( h' X1 s" ?* _not bald'.1
7 s3 v5 Y2 u4 y- O8 B- U5 \5 B0 LModern philosophers have devoted much attention to the study of analytic propositions,( R& N- ?6 @/ @
and many would agree with Professor Ayer that 'a proposition is analytic when its validity1 e6 q; J3 `# K6 B9 W5 z- c
depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains',2 and that this is so because
# E" R: Z5 c8 E( z8 oanalytic propositions 'do not make any assertion about the empirical world They simply1 ^3 Y4 L  o8 {
record our determination to use words in a certain fashion.'3 They are, in other words, tautologies;! Z) u) R$ @: f
and the reason why we think it worth while to assert them and sometimes, as in
" z0 X# }+ _+ Emathematics, to draw elaborate deductions from them, is that our reason is too limited to
$ ]( @& V" ~) r, ]. I- P6 rrecognize their full significance without going through these complex verbal processes.1 y. P. E3 O( j# Q+ l* c: q* D
These considerations may appear to be extremely abstract and their connection with. R/ u$ X7 g6 y: K$ D1 S
what is commonly understood as 'political philosophy' far from obvious; but in fact this
  x. U+ j, e9 E, }6 O; e& bconnection is both simple and fundamental. For philosophy is the 'quest for certainty', and( f# |+ ]3 j: Z
if certainty is a characteristic of propositions, then an inquiry into the nature and scope of/ ~4 n$ G/ o  z1 p$ G4 z
1 Critique of Pure Reason, Second Edition, Introduction.
7 [# @1 l& B2 k1 The Problems of Philosophy, p. 129.
. J1 v2 W3 @0 v3 X+ ?2 Language, Truth, and Logic, Second Edition, p. 78.
6 W& }0 g! Q2 f/ T. H( H# GJ op. cit, p. 84.
/ K& T4 n$ }) Q: [3 k( b2 ]" G" ~/ z; G0 |0 o8 h7 Z
certain, i.e. a priori, propositions must be the essential task of all philosophy. If, in other
# q/ l9 j8 L3 t# Nwords, the general object of philosophy is to discover the nature and implications of rational- y  J( c& d6 e: N7 @* a$ q* `
thinking, then an enquiry into the nature of the propositions by which rational thinking
' P1 f, H3 ?/ Mis expressed is necessarily one of the most important tasks of philosophy so understood
  N4 I0 }. B3 y8 ?All philosophers who have recognized the distinction between analytic and synthetic
  k, S0 J2 B: p1 r5 }+ `propositions have agreed that analytic propositions are necessary and a priori. Controversy) C: u/ q$ E" m3 m0 J6 ]
has centred on the question whether synthetic propositions may also sometimes be a priori.
  L7 v. ]# t  h% O' G& l4 FAnd the different answers given to this question have determined very different conceptions
* z4 J) v* Y* B$ V0 @$ Dof the scope and purpose of philosophy. For if the propositions of philosophy must4 U2 o9 g. G9 j2 b0 f) ]3 Z# D! K+ Z
always be a priori, and a priori propositions must always be analytic, it follows that the; E  m$ H2 H. i1 K5 L" |
propositions of philosophy must always be analytic.
" f& S# R4 \9 _0 X9 dNow one important class of proposition which is never analytic is the class of existential8 R: y6 P* a" Y( ~' J* Y' r
propositions, i.e. propositions asserting something of the real world. While it is necessarily
8 H4 \: c( d7 F1 @true that 2 plus 2 equals 4, it is not necessarily true that there are four distinguishable- K' q4 f3 R6 l! s$ h* A8 a& {& r* I
objects in the real world. For example, if I have £2 in one pocket and £2 in another, it necessarily# I! p- f. a; ?/ t) o8 B! U( R/ o
follows that I have £4. in both pockets, but it is for empirical observation to ascertain
/ l4 q2 V2 x/ b: ?( pwhether in fact I have £2 in one pocket and £2 in another pocket This simple example illustrates/ `4 A, _# V, ]
the important principle that analytic propositions apply only in a hypothetical sense
! e$ m6 z" H. E7 L2 g8 lto the real world. No analytic proposition of the form HA is BE can be asserted categorically
( N9 V, Y3 H7 |+ Jof the real world. It can only be asserted in the hypothetical form 'If X (some existing
: k3 M9 @. M+ F! V- n( J. ^( |thing) is A then it must be B.' But the proposition asserting that X is in fact A is synthetic: ?3 Y7 X) E/ t, z" e( X
and cannot be necessarily true unless synthetic propositions can be a priori! {# {8 L( |4 G8 K( D4 b; \/ a
Thus if a priori propositions are always analytic, philosophy will be unable to demonstrate* {! f3 E$ n* h, L; ]
the truth of any proposition about the existing world except in so far as it is logically
+ @* c; O5 |  ^8 w) m1 }) w, nimplied by an existential proposition whose truth has been established (if it can be established)+ G. w3 F7 W6 h- A& p& J
by empirical observation. The function of philosophy, in other words, will be to7 T. B, q; k3 K4 P) s% z- F
examine the implications of propositions and not to demonstrate their truth.
7 E1 ^5 `" R1 v0 F, M- ~& f% pAs already mentioned, however, it was widely believed until some fifty years ago that
; o  \* ?4 x4 N  \, U$ _/ iphilosophy could establish facts about the existing world quite independently of experience.! f$ U  L  z, z* z- t# S2 n
Philosophy was, indeed, often looked to for a rational justification of beliefs, such
! H& y# H" t0 o* i( kas religious or moral beliefs, already held on non-rational grounds, and it was assumed# c( Q( t* z8 q8 E6 h
that this justification could be given independently of experience. But during the present( X! v4 r% c/ C( m$ ~6 Z
century there has been a strong reaction from these methods and a growing acceptance of
% y) J4 ?3 r+ A% h3 f8 I7 S/ Y: [the alternative view that the function of philosophy is to clarify rather than to extend the
0 z" i+ n. B' Z& z+ `1 P! wcontent of human knowledge.
9 ^9 E/ k" T8 d/ _& S' P& i* J* \0 WThe theory that a priori thinking can never by itself establish a truth about the existing4 w& l' r6 J+ J5 c  I( _/ }- i" e
world is known as Empiricism, since it always asserts that such propositions can be
# O# ]0 w0 b5 N/ _+ z7 ~/ Mestablished only by empirical observation. The alternative theory that a priori thinking can- t+ e0 `3 Q% o$ `
by itself establish truths about the existing world is known as Rationalism. And it is clear
" J% b$ n( p6 q8 M, wfrom the preceding discussion that Rationalism can be defended only if synthetic a priori! o3 k1 b4 @* T0 k& Y+ d* A; x
propositions are possible. For if such propositions are not possible no proposition about the+ Q# W7 s% g' ?4 V% P7 A
existing world can be established a priori, and some form of Empiricism must therefore
$ I' R* |" h1 l5 T% e- f9 lbe accepted
4 d2 v! b9 ?( o( ~& Z. C3 E0 q3 H! B
Before the present century, when the doctrine has received wide support, the most celebrated! `& K. W2 [: q7 o0 O1 j
exponent of Empiricism was the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776),* |5 w4 t" r! S5 a# W
now generally recognized to have been one of the greatest philosophers of all time. Hume3 a  A2 _% \& e2 Q9 ^0 m# \
held that the only propositions which are certainly true are those which describe C relations3 \; D( N% D7 z' v, d
of ideas', by which he meant analytic relationships in the sense defined above. Those
1 ?, e2 {  k7 Y7 s  q5 Uwhich describe "matters of factU, i.e. synthetic propositions, cannot be rationally justified,
# P+ H% o/ z) K0 F9 lalthough they can be accepted as true in so far as they are justified by direct observation.4 n- o7 ^! x; I7 y' n& X
But of course the great majority of synthetic propositions—in particular, the socalled
- B& G' |1 ]+ P% ~( Y" e, Q- {'laws' of science—go far beyond this and make assertions which cannot be justified by( ?  a  _. {2 O. U( D
experience.+ a- Y$ U, W+ ]! d
Thus Hume argued that the belief in the universal truth of scientific laws follows  m! v6 b8 d2 }! |/ g5 }% D
repeated observations of the sequences which they describe; but he denied that there is any
% a+ k& g1 r8 y" \necessity in these sequences, or even in the occurrence of the belief that they are universal  {- d9 h; M: d1 L+ b0 H9 c6 J
and necessary. If I infer that, because all observed samples of arsenic have proved to be
1 ?, `/ u/ d* r6 X3 @# }" ~& I+ }poisonous, therefore all samples whatsoever are poisonous, no logical justification of this
# e4 l, u) g& X$ U# V0 Tinference can, according to Hume, be given. It is just a fact that, following on the observation8 K1 h" a( e- h; e
of numerous samples of arsenic which prove to be poisonous, everybody believes
8 Q7 Y2 h" _0 w8 C! K0 ^that all samples whatsoever will prove to be poisonous. But there is, according to Hume,
& E+ x. X0 U, k5 ~) vno rational justification for this belief; it just happens to occur following on experience of
, X: k. ]$ H1 e- |2 q4 @the effects of arsenic in a limited number of instances, and just happens to have proved a
' |) D; W* S4 u) x. `1 Rreliable guide in practice. There is no guarantee that it will prove to be true of all instances, t0 f! k7 w# q/ p" [6 }2 S% x
whatsoever. Thus there is nothing M reasonable' in the belief in the a priori sense.
+ Q  a! K. `* a( W+ W: {* y) e6 bHume reached the same sceptical conclusions about the general propositions of morality.
( F6 c) P9 [* U# t4 XHe thought it obvious that these propositions are synthetic, and argued that they cannot
: N1 ?# o! y" Gtherefore be a priori Such propositions as S Jealousy is evilK or Y Lying is wrongQ are,
" b+ B' l) `( C/ W4 w: [5 P! Ahe thought, obviously synthetic in that their predicates are not part of the meaning of the
9 c4 O+ t2 L. y% X2 Z! q1 Zsubjects. And such propositions cannot be a priori, for no necessary connection can, in his
- c5 F  ?2 e% ?view, be discerned between the subject and the predicate. Hence the basis for these moral9 i( P5 L+ y0 I$ V0 \2 O! ?& f
generalizations must be the same as the basis for the generalizations of natural science—2 j: `' J! ~5 y+ n' W
the observation of a limited number of instances. And this is not a rational ground for
* i" G+ K3 v/ ^5 j0 Q( Y% ^asserting them.
! q1 @% K, m7 }Having denied that moral generalizations have any logical necessity, Hume set himself
  q: J7 E' @4 H. fto analyse the empirical evidence on which they are based. He reached the conclusion that4 v5 @8 d( Y- A/ M8 s5 i
the basis of such generalizations is a peculiar type of sentiment or feeling. When I say
  n- F' u" a' w: g6 Y"Honesty is goodK I am, according to Hume, saying, in a rather specific sense of the word
+ }6 J, U5 M7 G" C0 {/ A'likeK, i Like honestyK. I am, in fact, describing not an inherent quality of honesty but a feeling
8 X+ F3 A4 `- `8 Kexcited in me by the contemplation of honesty. This feeling Hume called the 'pleasing; t3 \1 L$ l( ^: C
sentiment of approbationP. He thought that moral disapproval in the same way expresses a, z3 M; \/ {$ f* x2 t. g* V
sentiment of disapprobation. Thus Hume concluded that there is nothing "rationalW or "logicalN
5 A& H0 e% R) H# a9 @in morality and that it is impossible to show, on a priori grounds, that moral propositions
8 ~$ Q8 w/ a4 w, Dare true or false. Their truth or falsity depends on the purely empirical question
) `# |! g) P4 f/ [+ Hwhether they are or are not accurate descriptions of the feelings to which they relate.
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