返回列表 发帖

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY A R M MURRAY ebook 电子书代购

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY A R M MURRAY ebook 电子书代购

AN INTRODUCTION TO
4 Y  o% X' A- L0 xPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY3 [5 G5 r' `  w% p. Z2 H% C  [
by
$ n! C0 V& @6 n4 ^3 C. |- ]# QA.R.M.MURRAY, M.A., PH.D.
. m" L+ B2 m: C4 a9 lExtension Lecturer in Social Philosophy
$ A# N' T2 B9 Qin the University of London
' }, I4 c$ K0 ]7 @: L  m* y' P: i* e, @) c2 C5 Q
CONTENTS
( M! R! Q7 c/ Z. a5 {' U! C) Y4 @PAGE
0 Q9 a) X$ \1 s8 r+ c" bPREFACE vi7 a: B7 d! b7 G0 q' D0 G! S7 t
I THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1
' f8 q1 z; D0 OII THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE SOPHISTS 17) }  A  w% Q5 ?" x, D2 ~. H9 I
III PLATO'S THEORY OF THE IDEAL STATE 24- t3 e7 d/ ~" Y  h) e; r4 o) o: h% T
IV ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF THE BEST POSSIBLE STATE 37! t" x5 |( M3 D5 {
V POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN ARISTOTLE AND* J8 H% A: a0 s4 d# j4 h
MACHIAVELLI 47
! E( b2 X. N, m2 E; x( oVI MACHIAVELLI ON THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT 54
: N1 S9 C" I9 d% `# CVII HOBBES'S THEORY OF THE RATIONAL STATE 61& `) U& _# k. A; J$ f% Y
VIII LOCKE'S THEORY OF THE MORAL STATE 73
) ^1 t) ]+ `# C- ?8 w3 _8 k' lIX ROUSSEAU'S THEORY OF THE GENERAL WILL 825 V4 d( V' g5 e6 f
X HUME AND BURKE ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF
) X4 ]3 h+ h" yCONSERVATISM 92* ]3 s7 Q) l* n6 O" |: R
XI HEGEL'S IDEALIST THEORY OF THE STATE 100/ ]- \3 W* A2 @% r
XII THE UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF BENTHAM AND MILL 109& w2 M- u7 N3 ?
XIII MARXISM, COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM 123* e. O- G8 c* u" y& K  T5 C4 }% H3 @
XIV POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 140# k$ ~  A) t3 k  S( S. k3 C
XV THE JUSTIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT 151! N1 V! H1 M; A+ D4 d, G  M: ?
INDEX 161
( S0 ]6 p' L* A5 |3 R% F; ]. \' B4 D8 `5 }  v
CHAPTER I
+ S  x. q0 X: s5 T5 a4 tThe Nature and Scope of Political Philosophy% b1 t& D$ G3 ?. s; c
Until the beginning of the present century philosophy was generally regarded as a source$ Q+ `) q- f# e4 C; O/ J! ~
of knowledge which transcended, both in scope and certainty, the discoveries of natural
( X4 p2 a) L: Z  Fscience. Science, it was agreed, marked an advance on the uncritical and often unrelated
0 r. W$ u; ~' l5 _beliefs of ordinary life, yet it was itself based on the observations of the senses and consisted* z- ~- l" ~# E9 n
of the uncertain generalizations based upon them; whereas philosophy was assumed
0 l% M/ K, B' x& |/ _4 `to answer questions about such subjects as the existence of God, the nature of knowledge,2 T& Y* `" E  E0 T0 w
and the authority of the moral law upon which sense-experience, from its very nature, could' P1 g7 k' U8 H& W
throw no light. On such subjects, it was believed, reason was alone competent to pronounce0 A8 o& c5 b/ H. N
and, when it did so, its conclusions were characterized by a logical and universal certainty
1 X  ]7 c! z+ p& \; p1 fwhich the generalizations of natural science could never claim.' j, f6 m& S' I( M8 o3 G; U; l
That philosophical knowledge is certain and indubitable is a claim which, in a broad
* \2 }' j/ J$ ?sense, all philosophers have made, or at least implied; and if a short and simple definition
  M6 O9 O% y' Rof philosophy were sought the title of the late Professor Dewey 李 GirTord Lectures—The
  c. b7 [; C' L+ B7 k0 O, tQuest for Certainty'—might serve as a starting point at least For all philosophers have, P% W. K  y' d3 y* @% T0 u
claimed, or at least implied, that philosophical knowledge not only is, but must be, true.
( V. R7 I" ^+ J( u& v8 _& RBut this general agreement has not prevented fundamental differences of opinion regarding8 r  @6 J& E1 |' c' b. l! _
the nature and scope of such knowledge; and since these differences are reflected in the
' I! V/ u! d3 V! O2 ]7 Papplication of philosophy to the problems of political theory it is important to be aware,8 b) a, L4 I( i8 H( k. [
however generally, of their nature.
2 S- Q0 X% ~& Y7 ?6 i( m2 @+ wThe different conceptions of philosophy ultimately depend upon different conceptions
6 Y) d/ G* W$ I( W" gof the nature of indubitable knowledge. The propositions of mathematics are usually cited# \3 c" G! |$ L' ~1 F8 l5 d
as typical illustrations of such knowledge. For example, the proposition "Two plus two
9 ~( l8 _$ V' Z+ d" c9 C$ B6 _6 K% |: M6 D( wequals four1 is said to be necessarily and universally true on the ground that, once we have
. F0 n# h! o. f# E& jgrasped its meaning, we recognize that it must be necessarily and universally true, and
9 d5 W( M0 k0 O6 P5 R, f; J  s" Pbecause further instances of its truth do not increase our certainty that it must always be. n! @2 ~% ?( |6 M# n& D$ x
true. Its falsity, in other words, is inconceivable. On the other hand, there are numerous
  s: P+ c1 Y; ?( t/ g/ Q: L% ]propositions of which the falsity is perfectly conceivable. It may be true that The cat is4 a+ }4 h: N; B7 H
blackF or that "Poliomyelitis is caused by a vims', but these propositions are not necessarily5 z3 O$ c# ^1 s, }9 r  i( j
true. On the contrary, their falsity is perfectly conceivable, even if observation appears to
7 j! v! A( q1 `2 {confirm their truth.
; E7 H) Q6 V3 h, s" vAnalytic and Synthetic Propositions
$ f" \6 L8 F7 u8 |* W0 _  n6 lThe distinction just illustrated is variously referred to as the distinction between rational& b6 s2 w0 r3 l, W; g
and empirical knowledge, or between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, or between
, d- Z& ?3 s9 \/ X5 ctruths of reason and truths of fact And it is generally true to say that all philosophers have
. C7 J9 p0 I9 `6 A1 `" o; oclaimed, or at least implied, that their theories are rational and a priori. Where they have2 _( g( y6 I: E$ V
differed is in their view of the scope of such knowledge. And the main difference has been3 v" n) Y3 A% r( `9 k
that some have held that rational knowledge is always analytic, while others have held that3 F! ^- l5 o- i6 l! O1 b* y
it is sometimes synthetic.) T- M" w* h2 y$ ]3 B1 n- {8 M8 T4 |% @8 e
* d# q" D. h. @6 b( s' U' @4 k! H, N  i
The difference between analytic and synthetic propositions was defined by the German8 F& K$ S( R; S" K  v
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) as follows: Analytic propositions, he said, 'add. R+ }6 Y' ?5 d& b( L- z+ O
nothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely break it up into those2 k* y4 B6 i; i6 R
constituent concepts that have all along been thought in it, although confusedly', while synthetic# U( K( E+ W  ]9 c" r) N
judgments 'add to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any
, V! E- c  w; K2 n9 K9 d# }wise thought in it, and which no analysis could possibly extract from it'.1 The difference is,5 B$ q1 ]7 F1 y) r6 Y* {
in short, that the predicate in an analytic proposition is contained within the meaning of the
6 M. ?+ r; J; T; j  r% msubject, while in a synthetic proposition the predicate is not contained within the meaning# b. Z! \/ G& v
of the subject but adds something related to it. Kant illustrated the difference by the two1 \- C" @. E0 r2 m- E
propositions 'All bodies are extended' and 'All bodies are heavy'. The former, he thought,) ~2 @" D* O5 R
is analytic, because the concept of 'extension' is part of the meaning of 'body', while the
# r; ?# D: w7 f( }- [' a1 flatter is synthetic because the concept of 'heaviness' is not part of the meaning of 'body',
. g  x7 |* }" I  C! S$ L' r- Fbut only a quality which it acquires when it is placed in a gravitational field.
2 v0 [. ~( T  l2 P  [4 |Kant's definition drew attention to an important difference between analytic and synthetic, L" [7 w7 t/ l6 a
propositions, although not all analytic propositions naturally fall into the simple subject-8 n- G% b7 C5 m
predicate form which his examples illustrate. The essential characteristic of an analytic: A& v, w5 z; u/ x! S
proposition is that it defines the meaning, or part of the meaning, of its subject and does
6 J4 n& b% r. R1 N# [not describe unessential features which may, or may not, belong to it A cube of iron has a* h' ~8 f" u) }9 |: a
certain weight at sea level, a smaller weight at the top of a high mountain, and no weight at4 X) d. c, R: M6 }+ _) E" v
all at a certain point between the earth and the moon; but these differences are not essential
$ q6 g5 b9 a+ [+ Y  N" Aelements in the meaning of the description 'cube of iron'. It is clear, on the other hand,3 \; Y( f9 q6 y- f
that if the cube of iron had no extension it would not be a cube of iron, since extension is
% W; Q% ^, f" _" T6 |$ K2 Qan essential part of the meaning of the phrase 'cube of iron'. In other words, to deny an. r8 X: e/ O$ R7 r
analytic proposition is self-contradictory since that is simultaneously asserting and denying
) ]; {. C! p0 f' [the same thing. It is, to borrow Bertrand Russell's example, like saying 'A bald man is
3 A8 V# S4 ~; X) Enot bald'.13 y5 K! o9 z' M8 p( T, S
Modern philosophers have devoted much attention to the study of analytic propositions,
; J# A7 I  B# N* w0 R1 u, Fand many would agree with Professor Ayer that 'a proposition is analytic when its validity, f. V8 E( C% a& e5 D- g
depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains',2 and that this is so because2 w6 @) P8 s' w7 B) M; ^
analytic propositions 'do not make any assertion about the empirical world They simply
" K; F' F* P/ K: Crecord our determination to use words in a certain fashion.'3 They are, in other words, tautologies;2 q. m5 L3 M3 u* \8 Y# J1 }
and the reason why we think it worth while to assert them and sometimes, as in
" P+ I! H" h! W. [- w- f5 kmathematics, to draw elaborate deductions from them, is that our reason is too limited to6 t& a, u2 s- ?+ n2 m0 @0 U. s
recognize their full significance without going through these complex verbal processes.
5 N( |3 w2 F1 L1 L- RThese considerations may appear to be extremely abstract and their connection with+ |9 E7 t: U5 K/ G* {, i
what is commonly understood as 'political philosophy' far from obvious; but in fact this
8 p  B1 B. P8 M9 M! Qconnection is both simple and fundamental. For philosophy is the 'quest for certainty', and% u1 O6 _6 ?, b2 A! C4 \8 O
if certainty is a characteristic of propositions, then an inquiry into the nature and scope of
4 p) G+ P8 t5 M$ I( e2 D& K1 Critique of Pure Reason, Second Edition, Introduction.0 M/ [. ?! B3 f# @8 X8 c3 c# E" w
1 The Problems of Philosophy, p. 129.2 P) _1 N: o* T9 M
2 Language, Truth, and Logic, Second Edition, p. 78.* a2 A; {1 }8 X) o8 [4 P
J op. cit, p. 84.
# H& m3 x$ Z8 {) S# J% s
# N2 ^' B; Z% y2 A% l  [6 rcertain, i.e. a priori, propositions must be the essential task of all philosophy. If, in other
6 }4 S$ o+ g% y) A: i  `+ w; Jwords, the general object of philosophy is to discover the nature and implications of rational
5 z/ H6 c" ^" N7 o. }thinking, then an enquiry into the nature of the propositions by which rational thinking+ \8 d, t$ l2 u4 I) T7 I" R
is expressed is necessarily one of the most important tasks of philosophy so understood
, A1 s  C0 e' u/ u0 q% j% RAll philosophers who have recognized the distinction between analytic and synthetic9 W# i/ @7 [- u
propositions have agreed that analytic propositions are necessary and a priori. Controversy
0 |5 k* \) y; n# V2 K3 |& ihas centred on the question whether synthetic propositions may also sometimes be a priori.
; O/ B- y8 [6 `7 o: ~And the different answers given to this question have determined very different conceptions% N! _. [. z- o; x
of the scope and purpose of philosophy. For if the propositions of philosophy must
4 `5 M  E/ N& ]4 e. U/ {4 F+ i2 f3 nalways be a priori, and a priori propositions must always be analytic, it follows that the
( `, n- ~8 F, fpropositions of philosophy must always be analytic.
# S3 b: M4 T, A' v0 nNow one important class of proposition which is never analytic is the class of existential/ h% U8 E' R. l6 |6 _0 W% o( X
propositions, i.e. propositions asserting something of the real world. While it is necessarily
/ L; `1 U; G! B% btrue that 2 plus 2 equals 4, it is not necessarily true that there are four distinguishable
! V# R& j+ Z2 a6 _; i( |2 U# j% Qobjects in the real world. For example, if I have £2 in one pocket and £2 in another, it necessarily( a8 s( z$ C6 n) _6 C
follows that I have £4. in both pockets, but it is for empirical observation to ascertain+ ?# d$ T( D6 Z$ n
whether in fact I have £2 in one pocket and £2 in another pocket This simple example illustrates# _" o5 i5 `1 ?" i7 m+ f. p
the important principle that analytic propositions apply only in a hypothetical sense; o8 t4 O) O) t& t
to the real world. No analytic proposition of the form HA is BE can be asserted categorically8 G- L8 ^$ C2 L) V
of the real world. It can only be asserted in the hypothetical form 'If X (some existing) T1 w6 @, B! M% L
thing) is A then it must be B.' But the proposition asserting that X is in fact A is synthetic7 n! Y5 T9 {: \* [( X, V
and cannot be necessarily true unless synthetic propositions can be a priori
- l& L; d8 w) O' @Thus if a priori propositions are always analytic, philosophy will be unable to demonstrate, y) p( f; H+ T
the truth of any proposition about the existing world except in so far as it is logically
  t7 D+ ]5 r9 i; o/ t. j9 `implied by an existential proposition whose truth has been established (if it can be established)
4 p! M0 K7 G1 ~by empirical observation. The function of philosophy, in other words, will be to9 @* L+ D- k# i! u, G- O! H
examine the implications of propositions and not to demonstrate their truth.
% g$ \( a; g& S! _; ?1 S' AAs already mentioned, however, it was widely believed until some fifty years ago that
! G( v5 @+ j# A  a% \philosophy could establish facts about the existing world quite independently of experience.0 s4 B; l+ N) `( q6 q
Philosophy was, indeed, often looked to for a rational justification of beliefs, such
+ D/ W, ]* x6 i2 _! c' d; Qas religious or moral beliefs, already held on non-rational grounds, and it was assumed
4 j* z" D( O# h9 [  jthat this justification could be given independently of experience. But during the present% j' N6 U0 i, g! Z* `& w6 ]' q
century there has been a strong reaction from these methods and a growing acceptance of
0 B4 \9 A; U9 T) Z  rthe alternative view that the function of philosophy is to clarify rather than to extend the% A9 F$ W) x- Q; Y  e; A9 q
content of human knowledge.
' z: _3 g* u; x7 a" cThe theory that a priori thinking can never by itself establish a truth about the existing
1 u6 O# J* F( J; k' _1 S5 P( Rworld is known as Empiricism, since it always asserts that such propositions can be
* n+ c7 l3 V2 \! c  E1 H4 xestablished only by empirical observation. The alternative theory that a priori thinking can' p( M) X4 L% Y8 `/ w
by itself establish truths about the existing world is known as Rationalism. And it is clear* `- U3 i+ X" v, Z8 i3 i7 j
from the preceding discussion that Rationalism can be defended only if synthetic a priori
3 O  `3 C& }3 I. a6 d9 Ipropositions are possible. For if such propositions are not possible no proposition about the0 b- v. A; s2 \2 x5 _
existing world can be established a priori, and some form of Empiricism must therefore
& m0 O8 G8 J. O0 [7 _2 Wbe accepted2 H% W0 h: s  o* ?- K. f0 Q7 m
! V' v7 V$ b9 K
Before the present century, when the doctrine has received wide support, the most celebrated
$ f& l5 ^, V6 S0 N+ i0 v4 f; Z9 e1 lexponent of Empiricism was the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776),8 m5 I  @$ @4 A
now generally recognized to have been one of the greatest philosophers of all time. Hume0 K1 K+ _8 ^  k
held that the only propositions which are certainly true are those which describe C relations' |3 ~) E2 u2 e9 b" r) Z9 h0 r
of ideas', by which he meant analytic relationships in the sense defined above. Those1 N/ F( y6 u' p1 |) A
which describe "matters of factU, i.e. synthetic propositions, cannot be rationally justified,6 l' i2 K4 _/ S9 N
although they can be accepted as true in so far as they are justified by direct observation.! {& [4 C6 y5 s& T: q
But of course the great majority of synthetic propositions—in particular, the socalled. k% @) G2 z( o9 H1 A! d+ C. G
'laws' of science—go far beyond this and make assertions which cannot be justified by2 F! P$ Q* Z( D+ o" e% i
experience." V) Z8 \+ s1 O; x. P" ]0 D/ Z
Thus Hume argued that the belief in the universal truth of scientific laws follows
/ p: b0 N& {, x6 w% k; _repeated observations of the sequences which they describe; but he denied that there is any
* n8 D- s/ L8 g" z3 n1 c, hnecessity in these sequences, or even in the occurrence of the belief that they are universal
$ `6 B1 K( P8 w* y) }5 t. eand necessary. If I infer that, because all observed samples of arsenic have proved to be
3 Y+ D: P' }4 upoisonous, therefore all samples whatsoever are poisonous, no logical justification of this9 Y) o3 U/ e5 F: r0 n; p
inference can, according to Hume, be given. It is just a fact that, following on the observation
  w0 B2 g9 t, C1 ?. {of numerous samples of arsenic which prove to be poisonous, everybody believes
# f3 K2 T5 Q: h! g4 a% e+ t) ythat all samples whatsoever will prove to be poisonous. But there is, according to Hume,
5 p- C! R, q) X) zno rational justification for this belief; it just happens to occur following on experience of) K( s5 c# y5 o% ]& S
the effects of arsenic in a limited number of instances, and just happens to have proved a
& o6 o0 W2 N0 ]$ Qreliable guide in practice. There is no guarantee that it will prove to be true of all instances: X$ H8 G+ U% M6 V4 ?. y' x  ^
whatsoever. Thus there is nothing M reasonable' in the belief in the a priori sense.
$ m3 Z6 C8 Y) e, h# j! X* l& }5 F5 O) vHume reached the same sceptical conclusions about the general propositions of morality.
- o* o9 L. E- t: K4 }/ fHe thought it obvious that these propositions are synthetic, and argued that they cannot7 s3 U7 s. b, J0 L
therefore be a priori Such propositions as S Jealousy is evilK or Y Lying is wrongQ are,+ t  k8 e- n) P8 b+ j9 {8 }
he thought, obviously synthetic in that their predicates are not part of the meaning of the0 i+ b0 d9 V7 i2 W0 t! `; x: y
subjects. And such propositions cannot be a priori, for no necessary connection can, in his/ Q3 ?+ h( S# `  e
view, be discerned between the subject and the predicate. Hence the basis for these moral* S0 |; v% R4 N4 D+ S  c
generalizations must be the same as the basis for the generalizations of natural science—
3 Z+ w/ `2 l+ ~the observation of a limited number of instances. And this is not a rational ground for
& S5 W/ N8 y6 E8 T9 Aasserting them.
" ^3 D$ m' j$ @0 C8 G$ c  iHaving denied that moral generalizations have any logical necessity, Hume set himself
+ J( g5 C2 F0 {3 z) R3 ^" Pto analyse the empirical evidence on which they are based. He reached the conclusion that
7 r( j6 M8 K2 H5 @the basis of such generalizations is a peculiar type of sentiment or feeling. When I say
* I) k' U" [: J8 b8 j"Honesty is goodK I am, according to Hume, saying, in a rather specific sense of the word
! r  D6 e: a) E' z'likeK, i Like honestyK. I am, in fact, describing not an inherent quality of honesty but a feeling* M7 X9 _. x6 B! {% j7 j: P" [1 q; B
excited in me by the contemplation of honesty. This feeling Hume called the 'pleasing2 q9 ~- I$ X" F5 Z/ M
sentiment of approbationP. He thought that moral disapproval in the same way expresses a
2 o* x* E: t/ A# m2 {) e( a& Y/ ^sentiment of disapprobation. Thus Hume concluded that there is nothing "rationalW or "logicalN
9 u! C1 J8 A$ J9 `) Hin morality and that it is impossible to show, on a priori grounds, that moral propositions# T$ T0 C% k9 T7 D2 F; L6 {
are true or false. Their truth or falsity depends on the purely empirical question
! G3 q4 |4 s; ]4 B" Dwhether they are or are not accurate descriptions of the feelings to which they relate.$ f3 _. q4 A$ Y
utsa|rka;;23kD6+5LVp03HLC5via=| 1283980562
' J) A' N. p9 \+ o
' {0 J- h5 ~8 f6 A" O楠果
1 ~- X* N9 e5 `- I: q  ^/ y! j. y8 u% p% J) I+ x; `1 _
+ J4 Z: ~, J) k7 Z
4 l1 b* y% r, i* b6 a

+ r' B' }0 l" a' ~( b- d+ [, c0 H: ^" R* E
联系QQ:5267816183 L6 h+ L. W6 N
  U7 S/ e9 }* D2 n3 ^) t# {
淘宝旺旺:跟朝流走
+ V" P$ S8 K1 Y. h( q. x6 d& E, D3 J1 ]+ Q; {2 S: H: w
有需要的欢迎联系!专业代购电子书
  ^4 H" l7 ]1 W0 f  w1 f  w/ y# i
/ I: k# F0 @1 g

2 _* {# C+ \$ T7 e1 V  Nebook 英文电子书代购

返回列表